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ABSTRACT
In the first chapter, I offer a structural DSGE framework to analyze the impact of stochastic
information friction in explaining business cycles and asset prices. I document a new mecha-
nism to generate time variation in uncertainty from the information channel, where rational
agents’ beliefs from Bayesian learning features time-varying uncertainty in a stochastic im-
perfect information environment. Information uncertainty provides considerable explanatory
power for business fluctuations and carries a negative price of risk for asset valuations. The
interaction between imperfect information and financial market friction provides an impor-
tant channel to amplify the effect of information uncertainty on asset pricing. Empirical
evidence supports the model’s prediction of negatively priced information uncertainty risk.
Firms with high exposure to information friction shock generate significantly lower returns
than firms with low information friction shock exposure. A mimicking portfolio, IFS factor,
generates 6% excess return per annum.
The second chapter documents the history of aggregate positions in U.S. index options and
investigates the driving factors behind use of this class of derivatives. We construct several
measures of the magnitude of the market and characterize their level, trend, and covariates.
Measured in terms of volatility exposure, the market is economically small, but it embeds a
significant latent exposure to large price changes. Out-of-the-money puts are the dominant
component of open positions. Variation in options use is well described by a stochastic trend
driven by equity market activity and a significant negative response to increases in risk.
Using a rich collection of uncertainty proxies, we distinguish distinct responses to exogenous
macroeconomic risk, risk aversion, differences of opinion, and disaster risk. The results
are consistent with the view that the primary function of index options is the transfer of
unspanned crash risk.
The third chapter uses social networks to identify information transfer in security markets.
We focus on connections between mutual fund managers and investment banks via managers’
past working experience. We find mutual fund managers show significant stock picking skills
on firms which are the long-term clients of the investment banks for which the managers
formerly work. Managers perform significantly better on connected holdings relative to non-
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connected holdings. A replicating portfolio of connected stocks outperforms a replicating
portfolio of non-connected stocks by approximately 7.4% per annum. We also compare the
stock performance before and after two network-break events (firm switching investment
bank and Lehman’s collapse) and we find that managers’ stock picking skills disappear
when connections break. The results are consistent with mutual fund managers gaining an
informational advantage through the social networks.
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CHAPTER 1
STOCHASTIC INFORMATION FRICTION,
BUSINESS CYCLES AND ASSET PRICES
1.1 Introduction
Uncertainty and expectation play a central role in explaining business cycles and asset price
fluctuations. Economic conditions are perturbed by various uncertainties; rational agents
form expectations and make optimal decisions accordingly. A majority of macroeconomic
and asset pricing researchers focus on the uncertainty part. Economists propose various
types of shocks (to technology, investment, policy, etc.) to explain business cycles. However,
the expectation part draws less attention from academia. Some progress has been made re-
cently in the literature of imperfect information-driven business cycles, in which expectation
errors occur because of imperfect information. In this paper, I explore the idea that time-
varying imperfect information induces time variation in rational agents’ belief uncertainty –
thus generating fluctuations in macroeconomic quantities and asset prices at business cycle
frequencies.
Two recent works, Lorenzoni (2009) and Blanchard et al. (2013), have renewed attention
to imperfect information and limited information processing as sources of expectational er-
rors in a rational framework. The key story is: fundamental productivity is unobservable;
agents learn it from noisy public signals and form rational beliefs. Thus, the presence of
noisy signals generates expectation errors. In these papers, the noise level in the public sig-
nals is constant. It captures the information quality in the economy. In contrast to previous
studies, I ask the questions: what if the information quality is time-varying and subject to
uncertainty shock? Does information uncertainty affect business cycles or asset price dy-
namics? Intuitively, when information quality is bad, the signal extraction problem becomes
less precise and agents’ beliefs become more uncertain. To better answer these questions, I
conduct a structural analysis under a rational DSGE framework, and study the impact of
time-varying information uncertainty on macroeconomic dynamics and asset prices.
The analysis is based on a standard real business cycle model with three main ingredients.
First, I introduce both permanent and transitory productivity shocks. Agents observe the
total productivity, but not the decomposition of the two parts. In addition to total produc-
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tivity, agents have access to another noisy signal regarding the permanent component of the
productivity. Second, I incorporate the time-varying information environment, by introduc-
ing Information Friction Shocks (IFS), which affect the noise level of the noisy signal that
agents receive. Rational agents update their beliefs with Bayesian learning. The information
friction shocks affect agents’ inference problems and generate time-varying belief uncertainty.
Belief dispersion becomes wider when information friction is more severe. Third, I incorpo-
rate a reduced-form financial sector – exhibiting time-variant financial frictions – which is
correlated with the information condition. Severe information imperfection induces higher
financial friction, resulting in higher capital adjustment cost.
Information friction plays two roles in the model. The first role is to generate time-variant
belief uncertainty through Bayesian learning. Deterioration in information quality induces
more uncertainty in agents’ beliefs. The second role is to affect the allocation efficiency
through interaction with financial market friction. Deterioration in information quality in-
duces greater costs associated with information acquisition and greater capital adjustment
costs. I calibrate the model to match the moments of key macroeconomic variables and asset
returns. A positive information friction shock increases belief uncertainty. In response to this
higher belief uncertainty, households consume less, invest more, and work more. Marginal
utility of consumption responds positively to the information friction shock through interac-
tion with the financial friction channel. The model predicts a negatively priced risk associated
with information friction uncertainty.
To validate the model’s prediction, I explore the asset pricing implication empirically.
First, I construct an empirical measure to proxy for information friction shocks. In the
model, information friction is closely related to belief uncertainty of the current period’s
productivity. Therefore, I use the Survey of Professional Forecasters data, and focus on the
individual-level forecast of nominal GDP of the current quarter to construct the belief dis-
persion measure. Belief dispersion (BD) is defined as the 75 and 25 percentile differences in
the logarithm of nominal GDP. To mitigate the concern that belief dispersion may be driven
by fundamental macro uncertainty, I orthogonalize the time series of belief dispersion using
estimates from Jurado et al. (2015) to control any effects from the fundamental uncertainty
channel. The remaining orthogonalized part is defined as the proxy for information friction
shocks (IFS).
With the empirical proxy for information friction shocks, I use Fama-French 25 size-value
portfolios to test whether IFS is a priced risk factor. The results show a significant negative
price of risk for these test assets. The classical Fama-French 3 factors model is able to explain
the test portfolios’ returns with an R2 of 70%. Adding the IFS factor into the Fama-French
3 factor model significantly improves the explanatory power of test assets’ returns, with an
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R2 increased from 70% to 80%. I also explore the cross-sectional return predictability using
portfolio sorts methodology. My main finding is that exposure to information uncertainty
risk strongly predicts future asset returns. Firms with high exposure to information friction
shock generate significantly lower returns than firms with low information friction shock
exposure. The estimated risk premium associated with information friction shock is negative
and statistically significant. A long-short zero investment strategy earns a significant 55 bps
excess return per month, or about 6.8% per annum. All of these empirical findings are
consistent with the model prediction of a negatively priced information uncertainty risk.
Since the seminal work of Bloom (2009), a large and growing body of literature has stud-
ied the effects of uncertainty shock in explaining macroeconomic dynamics. It is important
to distinguish information uncertainty, which is the main interest of this paper, from fun-
damental uncertainty. The previous works on uncertainty shocks are usually studied in a
perfect information environment. The uncertainty shock is typically defined as the con-
ditional volatility of a disturbance to economic fundamentals. Agents are sure about the
economic condition today, but are not sure about the volatility tomorrow. However, infor-
mation uncertainty in this paper refers to the agents’ beliefs uncertainty about the economic
condition today which features time-variant volatility, even when economic fundamentals
do not exhibit second moment variations. One important message this article delivers is
that time variation in uncertainty could be generated from two mechanisms. One is macro
uncertainty from the fundamental channel; the other is information uncertainty from the
information channel. To better understand the time-varying uncertainty from these two
channels, I also analyze a DSGE model with both information friction shocks and uncer-
tainty shocks. Both contribute to the explanation of macroeconomic quantities and asset
prices. Both information uncertainty and fundamental uncertainty carry a negative price of
risk. I find information uncertainty and fundamental uncertainty each contributes 50% to
the total uncertainty risk in the model.
Through the welfare analysis, I find high information friction harms social welfare. A
policy implication is to reduce the information uncertainty. Increasing the quality of public
news, increasing the accuracy of public reports, increasing transparency, and reducing pol-
icy uncertainty are all effective ways to reduce information uncertainty or costs associated
with information acquisition in the economy. Reducing information friction enhances social
welfare by increasing allocation efficiency.
Related Literature This paper is mainly related to three strands of the literature: 1)
expectational error driven business cycles, 2) the literature that aims to explain the joint
behavior of macroeconomic dynamics and asset prices, and 3) uncertainty shocks.
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First, this paper contributes to the expectational error driven business cycles literature.
The idea that imperfect information can cause sluggish adjustment in economic variables
and generate fluctuation driven by expectational errors goes back, at least, to Lucas (1972).
More recently, Blanchard et al. (2013) and Boz et al. (2011) have renewed attention to
imperfect information and limited information processing as sources of expectational errors
in a rational framework. Along this direction, there is also some progress in asset pricing
literature featuring imperfect information with rational learning, such as Ai (2010). In all
of these models, the economy features a constant level of information imperfection. The
noisy signal about the unobservable has a constant noise level. In contrast to these papers, I
allow the noise level to be time-varying, thus inducing time-variant beliefs uncertainty. To my
knowledge, this paper is the first to incorporate a time-variant information environment with
Bayesian learning into the DSGE model to study the effects of time-varying expectational
errors.
Second, this paper contributes to a growing body of literature on macroeconomic asset
pricing models that aims to jointly explain macroeconomic quantities and asset prices. The
starting point of this literature goes back to Jermann (1998) and Tallarini (2000). Some
recent progress includes work by Croce (2014) and Papanikolaou (2011). Croce (2014) con-
siders a one-sector stochastic growth model with Epstein-Zin preferences and examines the
long-run productivity risk. Papanikolaou (2011) considers a multi-sector model and explores
the cross-sectional risk premia from investment-specific technology shocks. In contrast to
their studies, I focus on the implications of information friction shocks risk premium. I also
incorporate financial friction shocks into the model. The interaction between information
friction and financial friction provides a promising and considerable explanation power for
both macroeconomic quantities and asset valuation fluctuations.
Third, this paper also contributes to the vast literature on uncertainty shocks. The ef-
fects of uncertainty shocks have been widely studied in business cycles and asset pricing,
e.g. Bloom (2009) and Bansal et al. (2014). These works are usually studied in a perfect
information environment. The uncertainty shocks from these works come from the pertur-
bation of economic fundamentals. One novelty of this paper is that I am able to distinguish
between information uncertainty and fundamental uncertainty in an economy featuring im-
perfect information. The information uncertainty comes from the imperfect information
channel via Bayesian learning; it doesn’t depend on economic fundamentals. One important
message this article delivers is that time variation in uncertainty could be generated from
two mechanisms. Both contribute to explain macroeconomic quantities and asset prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model; Section
3 solves the Bayesian learning problem; Section 4 presents the model solutions and illustrates
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the main mechanism; Section 5 investigates the asset pricing implication from the model,
followed by the empirical evidence in Section 6; Section 7 presents the analysis of a model
with both information and fundamental uncertainty shocks; Section 8 offers some concluding
remarks.
1.2 A Model with Stochastic Information Friction
Production
There is one representative firm in the economy. The production takes a standard Cobb-
Douglas form, with capital Kt and labor Lt as inputs
Yt = (AtLt)
1−αKαt (1.1)
where Yt is the output and α ∈ (0, 1) is the capital’s share of output. Notice that this
specification ensures a balanced growth path, and A1−αt is the total factor productivity
(TFP). There is a deterministic growth component Γt in the productivity At.
At = Γ
teat (1.2)
The term µ ≡ log(Γ) represents the deterministic long run growth rate. The at (in logs)
represents the business cycle component of the productivity. Productivity at has two com-
ponents: the permanent component xt and the transitory component zt.
at = xt + zt (1.3)
The permanent component xt follows the unit root process. It builds up gradually with a
series of ”growth” shocks gt ≡ ∆xt. In particular, gt follows a stationary AR(1) process.
gt = ρggt−1 + σg
g
t (1.4)
The transitory component zt also follows a stationary AR(1) process.
zt = ρzzt−1 + σzzt (1.5)
The coefficients ρg and ρz are in [0, 1), 
g
t and 
z
t are i.i.d. standard normal shocks.
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Stochastic Information Friction
The economy features an imperfect information environment. Productivity is driven by two
shocks: a permanent shock and a transitory shock. The agent does not observe the two
shocks separately, but only the realized level of productivity. This creates a signal extrac-
tion problem for the agent. On top of observing the realized at each period, the agent
receives an additional noisy signal regarding the permanent component of the productiv-
ity. This captures the idea that agents in the economy process public information, such as
macro quantities reports, financial news, etc., and form exceptions regarding the economic
fundamentals.
st = xt + σst
s
t (1.6)
This third source of information is also noisy. The signal st is driven by i.i.d. standard
normal shocks st , which I call ”noise” shocks. The σst is time-varying. This captures the
idea that the information environment of the economy is stochastic. I interpret this as
stochastic information friction. The σst controls the degree of information imperfection. A
high σst means severe information friction. I assume the logarithm of σst follows a stationary
AR(1) process, and it is perturbed by i.i.d. standard normal shocks ηst .
log(σst) = (1− κs) log(σ¯s) + κs log(σst−1) + ωsηst (1.7)
This way of modeling the logarithm of σst ensures that the standard deviation of the shocks
remains positive at all times. The σst is perturbed by i.i.d. innovations η
s
t , which I call
”Information Friction Shock” (IFS). A bad IFS increases σst, and the information friction
becomes more severe. The signal st becomes more noisy and less informative. It becomes
more difficult for agents to extract the true economic fundamentals. As σst → ∞, st does
not provide any additional information compared to the realizations of at. As σst → 0,
households perfectly infer the permanent and transitory components to productivity; thus,
the economy features a perfect information environment in that case.
Preference
The representative household has Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) recursive prefer-
ences over streams of consumption Ct and leisure 1− Lt.
Vt =
{
(1− β) (Cθt (1− Lt)1−θ)1− 1ψ + βEt [V 1−γt+1 ] 1− 1ψ1−γ
} 1
1− 1
ψ
(1.8)
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The preference parameters are the discount factor β, risk aversion γ, and the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (EIS) ψ. The parameter θ controls the leisure share. In this
economy, the stochastic discount factor (SDF) can be written as:
Mt+1 = β
(
Cθt+1(1− Lt+1)1−θ
Cθt (1− Lt)1−θ
)1− 1
ψ
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−1 Vt+1
Et
[
V 1−γt+1
] 1
1−γ
 1ψ−γ (1.9)
The EZ framework features the timing preferences of the resolution of uncertainty. If γ >
1/ψ, the agent prefers an early resolution of uncertainty, and if γ < 1/ψ, a later resolution.
When γ = 1/ψ, the representative agent is indifferent to the resolution of uncertainty, and
the recursive preferences collapse to the CRRA case.
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility, subject to the resource constraint.
Yt = Ct + It (1.10)
Capital Market and Financial Friction
The household can convert consumption into capital by investing in capital markets. The
firm accumulates capital according to the following inter-temporal law of motion:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + φ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt (1.11)
Capital depreciates at the rate δ. φ(.) is a positive concave function, capturing capital market
friction. I follow Jermann (1998) and specify the φ(.) in a similar form.
φ
(
It
Kt
)
= τ1 +
τ2
1− 1
ξt
(
It
Kt
)1− 1
ξt
(1.12)
The τ1 and τ2 are constants. They are set to ensure that adjustment costs do not affect the
steady state of the model 1. The only difference from Jermann (1998) is the time-varying
ξt. The ξt captures the elasticity of the investment-capital ratio with respect to Tobin’s
Q. Higher ξt represents smaller capital adjustment costs. If ξt = +∞, the capital market
becomes frictionless. The ξt evolves according to the following equations:
ξt = (ξ¯ − 1)eft + 1 (1.13)
1In particular, I set τ1 = (e
µ + δ − 1)/(1− ξ¯) and τ2 = (eµ + δ − 1)1/ξ¯
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ft = ρfft−1 + σf
f
t (1.14)
Note the specification of (1.13) ensures the ξt is always greater than 1 if the steady state
value ξ¯ is greater than 1. In a reduced form, ft captures the financial friction in the market.
It follows a stationary AR(1) process, and it is perturbed by i.i.d. standard normal shock
ft . A positive 
f
t shock will increase the ft and ξt, and firms will pay less capital adjustment
cost. In the model, I allow financial friction shock ft and information friction shock η
s
t to
be correlated, and use %sf to denote the correlation coefficient between the two shocks. This
is motivated by a vast body of literature that investigates the relationship between capital
markets and information asymmetry (Greenwald et al. (1984) and Ivashina (2009)).
Labor Market
The representative household also supplies labor service Lt to the production firm. Wage
rate wt is set at the marginal product of labor. But the firm pays an extra wage adjustment
cost as shown in the quadratic form below.
φLt = ξw
(
1− At−1
At−2
wt−1
wt
)2
wtLt (1.15)
Asset Prices
The firm dividend Dt is specified as
Dt = Yt − ιKt − It − wtLt − φLt (1.16)
where ι denotes operating cost per unit of capital. Yt − ιKt represents the operating profit
of the firm. The operating cost ιKt and wage adjustment cost φ
L
t provide some operating
leverage effects for the dividend claim. I assume these costs paid by the firm go to the
household as a form of household income, so that the resource constraint in equation (1.10)
still holds. The firm maximizes firm value, which is equal to the present discounted value of
all current and future expected dividend flows. The firm’s equity return is
REt ≡
Pt +Dt
Pt−1
(1.17)
where Pt denotes the price of a claim on all future dividends.
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Equilibrium Conditions
The economy is non-stationary. To derive a stationary equilibrium, I de-trend all the non-
stationary variables by At−1. A variable with a tilde represents its re-scaled counterpart.
Note that the choice of At−1 as the normalization factor ensures the information consistency
of the model, if vart is in the agent’s information set at time t− 1, so is the v˜art.
The welfare theorems hold in the model. The equilibrium can be characterized by the solu-
tion of the social planner’s problem. The value function is homogeneous of degree θ. Taking
advantage of this homotheticity property, the normalized stationary model is formulated in
the recursive form as follows,
V˜t(xt|t, gt|t, zt|t, σst, K˜t) = max
C˜t,Lt
(1− β)(C˜θt (1− Lt)1−θ)1− 1ψ + A˜θ(1− 1ψ )t βEt [V˜ 1−γt+1 ]
1− 1
ψ
1−γ

1
1− 1
ψ
(1.18)
subject to resource constraint. The variables xt|t, gt|t, and zt|t are the agent’s rational beliefs
regarding each component of the productivity from Kalman learning. The optimal condition
for consumption yields the Euler equation:
1 = Et
[
Mt+1R
I
t+1
]
(1.19)
The stochastic discount factor Mt+1 and investment return R
I
t+1 take the following form:
Mt+1 = A˜
θ(1− 1
ψ
)−1
t β
(
C˜θt+1(1− Lt+1)1−θ
C˜θt (1− Lt)1−θ
)1− 1
ψ
(
C˜t+1
C˜t
)−1 V˜t+1
Et
[
V˜ 1−γt+1
] 1
1−γ

1
ψ
−γ
(1.20)
RIt = τ2
(
I˜t
K˜t
)− 1
ξt
αY˜t+1K˜t+1 + 1τ2 ( I˜t+1K˜t+1)− 1ξt+1
1− δ + τ1 + τ2
ξt+1 − 1
(
I˜t+1
K˜t+1
)1− 1
ξt+1


(1.21)
The risk-free rate is just the reciprocal of expected SDF.
Rft =
1
Et [Mt+1]
(1.22)
The optimal condition for labor choice satisfies the marginal rate of substitution between
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consumption and leisure, equal to the marginal product of labor.
1− θ
θ
C˜t
1− Lt =
(1− α) Y˜t
Lt
(1.23)
1.3 Bayesian Learning and Kalman Filter
1.3.1 Derivation of Kalman Filter
In an environment in which agents have imperfect information regarding the true decompo-
sition of the productivity shock into its permanent and transitory components, the rational
agent forms expectations regarding the decomposition using the Kalman filter. This filter is
a commonly used method to estimate the values of state variables of a dynamic system that
is excited by stochastic disturbances and measurement noise. To formulate the signal extrac-
tion problem with the Kalman filter, I express the filtering problem in a general state space
form, which consists of a transition equation (1.24) and a measurement equation (1.25).
xt = Atxt−1 +Btvt vt ∼ N (0,Qt) (1.24)
st = Ctxt +Dtwt wt ∼ N (0,Rt) (1.25)
Uncertainty is captured by the first transition equation of the exogenous state vector xt. The
agent observes the vector st expressed in the second measurement equation, which contains
noise to the true signal. The At, Bt, Ct, Dt, Qt and Rt are system matrices; vt and wt are
vectors of mutually independent i.i.d. shocks. More specifically, for this model, the state
vector is xt = (xt, gt, zt)
ᵀ, the measurement vector is st = (at, st)
ᵀ, the shock vectors are
10
vt = wt = (
g
t , 
z
t , 
s
t)
ᵀ, and the system matrices At, Bt, Ct, Dt, Qt and Rt are
At =
1 ρg 00 ρg 0
0 0 ρz
Bt =
σg 0 0σg 0 0
0 σz 0

Ct =
[
1 0 1
1 0 0
]
Dt =
[
0 0 0
0 0 σst
]
Qt = Rt =
1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
 .
Note that, in this setting, I express the standard deviation parameters of the shocks in the
Bt and Dt matrices. Qt and Rt are time-invariant 3 × 3 identity matrices. In the baseline
model, the parameters in matrix At and Ct are also time-invariant, so I simply drop the
subscript t, and use A, C, Q and R from now on. The time-varying matrix Dt contains the
parameter σst, which controls the degree of information friction in the economy. When σst =
0, st and at together fully reveal the components of productivity. This leads to an economy
with a perfect information environment. The matrix Bt contains σg and σz, which control
the volatility of fundamental productivity. In this baseline model, fundamental uncertainty
is constant, so I simply use B without the subscript t. In the later section, I also consider an
economy with fundamental stochastic volatility. In that case, matrices Bt and Dt are both
time-varying.
To derive the recursive form of the Kalman filter, let me first define the following variables.
I use xt|t to denote the agent’s expectation regarding xt based on all information at time t,
and Pt|t for the a posteriori error covariance matrix:
xt|t ≡ Et[xt]
Pt|t ≡ Et[(xt − xt|t)(xt − xt|t)ᵀ]
Let xt|t−1 denote the agent’s expectation prior the new measurement st, and Pt|t−1 denote
the a priori error covariance matrix:
xt|t−1 ≡ Et−1[xt]
11
Pt|t−1 ≡ Et[(xt − xt|t−1)(xt − xt|t−1)ᵀ]
The essence of the Kalman filter algorithm is estimating the state process by implementing
a linear form feedback control. The filter estimates the process state through transition
equation, and then obtains feedback from the measurement equation. As such, the recursive
form of the Kalman filter after the a posteriori error minimization problem falls into two
groups: updating equations (1.26, 1.27, 1.28) and projecting equations (1.29, 1.30).
xt|t = (I−KtC)xt|t−1 +Ktst (1.26)
Kt = Pt|t−1Cᵀ(CPt|t−1Cᵀ +DtRD
ᵀ
t )
−1 (1.27)
Pt|t = (I−KtC)Pt|t−1 (1.28)
The projecting equations are responsible for projecting forward the current state and error
covariance estimate. They produce an a priori estimate for the next time step. The updating
equations are responsible for the feedback. They incorporate the new measurement into the a
priori estimate and produce an improved a posteriori estimate. The matrix Kt is the Kalman
gain, a result from the estimate error minimization problem in each step. It controls the
relative weights on the a priori estimate and new measurement.
xt+1|t = Axt|t (1.29)
Pt+1|t = APt|tAᵀ +BQBᵀ (1.30)
1.3.2 Time-Variant Bayesian Learning
With updating and projecting equations, I can express the Kalman filter problem in any
recursive form. Particularly, in the form of a priori error covariance matrix, I derive the
algebratic Riccati equation:
Pt+1|t = A(I−KtC)Pt|t−1Aᵀ +BQBᵀ (1.31)
When system matrices are all time-invariant, Kalman gain, a priori and a posteriori error
covariance matrices converge monotonically to a time-invariant solution. I can get these
steady state values by recursively solving the Riccati equation. Using P˚t and P̂t to denote
the steady a priori and a posteriori error covariance matrix, the recursive Riccati algorithm
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is expressed in the following three equations.
P˚ = A(I−KC)P˚Aᵀ +BQBᵀ (1.32)
K = P˚Cᵀ(CP˚Cᵀ +DRDᵀ)−1 (1.33)
P̂ = (I−KC)P˚ (1.34)
However, in my model, the learning problem is time-variant. The matrix Dt is time-varying
because of the σst. Thus, the Kalman learning variables Kt, P˚t and P̂t are all time-varying,
and depend on the state of σst at time t. I assume σst is public information to agent at time
t. Unfortunately, there are no close form solutions for the Kt/P˚t/P̂t-to-σst mapping. I use
a numerical method to approximate these mappings. First, I select a reasonably wide range
of σs space
[
σLBs , σ
UB
s
]
, and discretize it with ns points. Then, for each σ
i
s, i = 1, 2, ...ns , I
recursively solve the Riccati equation, and get the corresponding Kalman gain Ki, similarly
for the a priori and a posteriori error covariance matrix P˚i and P̂i. Finally, I use an np order
of Chebyshev polynomials or power polynomials to approximate these ns pair mappings with
a reasonably low approximation error level. Generally, an np = 5 order approximation for
ns = 100 pair mapping is good enough to maintain the approximation error below 1× 10−4
level.
1.3.3 Dynamics of Bayesian Beliefs
To formulate the representative agent’s optimization problem in the recursive form and solve
the model, I need to solve the law of motion of the agent’s a posteriori beliefs xt|t regarding
fundamental productivity. In other words, xt|t are state variables. The fundamental produc-
tivity variables, xt, gt or zt are not state variables, since they are unobservable. To derive
the dynamics of xt|t, I re-write the following two equations:
xt|t = Axt−1|t−1 +Kt
(
st −CAxt−1|t−1
)
(1.35)
st = CAxt−1|t−1 +
(
st −CAxt−1|t−1
)
(1.36)
The first equation comes from (1.26) and (1.29); the second equation is a mathematical
identity. Let me define ut = st − CAxt−1|t−1. This term represents the measurement
surprise, because CAxt−1|t−1 is the best estimate of time t signal, st|t−1, based on all available
information at t− 1. Let me also define t = V art−1 [ut]. I derive the relationship of t and
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system matrices in equation (1.37).
t = C
(
APt−1|t−1Aᵀ +BQBᵀ
)
Cᵀ +DtRD
ᵀ
t (1.37)
Then I decompose the matrix t as
t = HtH
ᵀ
t (1.38)
and re-write the joint dynamics of xt|t and st in the following form:
xt|t = Axt−1|t−1 +KtHtuˆt (1.39)
st = CAxt−1|t−1 +Htuˆt (1.40)
where uˆt is a vector of mutually independent i.i.d. standard normal shocks. Equations (1.39)
and (1.40) fully characterize the evolution of the agent’s beliefs. With these two equations,
I convert the original model with unobservable information to an equivalent model with full
information and correlated shocks.
1.4 Quantitative Analysis
The goal of this section is to evaluate the quantitative effects of stochastic information
friction. To do so, I numerically solve the DSGE model with the 3rd-order perturbation
method. A real business cycle model with information friction shocks can simultaneously
match the key moments of macroeconomic variables and asset returns. The macroeconomic
effects are captured by the impulse responses to the shocks. Though simulation, I also show
that information friction shocks are important for capturing the dynamics of real business
cycle quantities.
1.4.1 Numerical Method
The body of literature on DSGE computation methods is very large. Commonly used meth-
ods include value function iteration, perturbation, Chebychev polynomials, finite element
methods, etc. Here I select the perturbation method that I find most promising in terms
of accuracy and efficiency and implement a 3rd-order perturbation of the model. The 1st-
order perturbation is useless here, particularly because of the recursive preference and second
moment shocks ingredients in the model. Note that the most common solution methods, lin-
earization and log-linearization, are particular cases of 1st-order perturbation. Essentially,
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the decision rules from 1st-order approximation are certainty equivalent. Therefore, they
depend on ψ, but not on γ or σst. In order to allow recursive preference and second moment
shocks to play a role, I need to go at least to 2nd-order perturbation to have terms that
depend on γ or σst. Even in 2nd-order approximation, the effect of uncertainty shocks is
limited. I say limited because the mean is affected but not the dynamics. For this reason,
we are interested especially in the time-varying risk premia; a 3rd-order or even higher order
perturbation is preferred. I solve the model using a 3rd-order perturbation method with
Dynare and MatLab. For a 4th-order approximation, I use Mathematica, which works very
well with symbolic algebra and symbolic equation manipulations. I perform the higher order
perturbation to mitigate the concerns that lower order approximation may contain large
errors if the model exhibits high non-linearity. The accuracy of 3rd-order perturbation in
terms of Euler equation errors is excellent – even far way from the steady state. Throughout
the paper, I report the numerical results from the 3rd-order perturbation solutions.
1.4.2 Parameterization
I select a benchmark calibration for the numerical computations. The parameter values are
chosen to match basic observations of the US economy, and they align closely with common
choices in the literature. Table 1.1 summarizes the full set of parameters in my benchmark
calibration. I take one period in the model to represent one quarter.
On the preference side, the quarterly discount factor β is set to 0.994 to match the risk-
free interest rate. The value for labor share θ is set to 0.36, implying that the share of time
devoted to work is one-third in the steady state. Aligned with the long-run risk literature,
the relative risk aversion and EIS are set as γ = 8 and ψ = 2.
On the production side, the long run deterministic growth rate µ is set to 0.0049 to match
the GDP growth in the US. The capital exponent in production function α is calibrated
to match the capital income share. The capital depreciation rate is set as 2.5%, which is
standard for a quarterly frequency model. The steady state value of capital adjustment cost
ξ¯ is set to 20.
On the information friction side, the average information friction level is set as σ¯s = 0.0147,
which is consistent with Blanchard et al. (2013). The persistence of information friction shock
κs is set to 0.9, and the standard deviation of information friction shock ωs is set to 0.02.
There is no debt in the model. In data, equity returns are levered, and some portion of
dividend growth volatility is due to idiosyncratic payout shocks. To better compare the data
with the model, I multiply risk premia and standard deviations of stock returns by a leverage
parameter of 2.
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Table 1.1: Parameterization - Baseline Model
Parameters Symbol Value
Preference
Discount factor β 0.994
Risk aversion γ 8.0
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ 2.0
Leisure exponent in utility θ 0.36
Technology
Capital exponent in production α 0.34
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Deterministic growth rate µ 0.0049
Persistence of permanent productivity shock ρg 0.89
Volatility of permanent productivity shock σg 0.002
Persistence of transitory productivity shock ρz 0.89
Volatility of transitory productivity shock σz 0.015
Capital adjustment cost ξ¯ 20.0
Persistence of financial friction shock ρf 0.80
Volatility of financial friction shock σf 0.04
Operating cost ι 0.0018
Wage adjustment cost ξw 15.0
Information Friction
Average level of information friction σ¯s 0.0147
Persistence of information friction shock κs 0.90
Volatility of information friction shock ωs 0.02
Correlation
Corr(ηst , 
f
t ) %
sf -0.90
1.4.3 Impulse Responses
Figure 1.1 shows the impulse responses for four observed macro variables to one standard
deviation of permanent technology shock, transitory technology shock, and noise shock re-
spectively. All four variables show similar patterns in response to the three shocks. They
respond primarily to the transitory productivity shock and noise shock in the short run. In
response to a permanent shock, they build up slowly over time, because it takes a longer
period for agents to recognize the permanent shocks. Noise shock generates some short-term
fluctuations, but the response also dies down very fast. In response to a noise shock, agents
consume more and invest less, because they assign a positive probability to the case that the
shock might be a permanent productivity shock. Agents quickly learn that the shock is just
16
noise; those responses quickly return to zero.
Figure 1.1: Impulse Responses
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By nature, the information friction shocks are second moment shocks. They affect the
shape of impulse responses by affecting the initial state when other shocks hit the economy. In
Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4, I plot the impulse responses to three shocks in two different scenarios,
in which the initial state is high (σst = H) or low (σst = L) information friction. I also plot
the impulse responses for the perfect information case. This perfect information scenario
is a special case where agents fully observe the permanent and transitory components; it is
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captured as σst = 0.
Figure 1.2: Impulse Responses to Permanent Productivity Shock
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With perfect information, in response to a permanent productivity shock, agents consume
more, cut investments, and work less, because they know productivity will be high tomorrow.
However, when there is information friction, agents assign a positive probability to the case
that the shock might just be noise or transitory. The more severe information friction is, the
less probability agents assign to a permanent shock. So agents consume less, invest more,
and work harder when information friction is severe, as shown in Figure 1.2. Agents display
consumption smoothing behavior.
In response to a transitory productivity shock, the magnitude of initial response is very
similar under the three scenarios shown in Figure 1.3. However, the degree of information
friction does affect persistence. When σst is high, responses to transitory shocks die out
very fast, because productivity shocks are less informative when information friction is high.
Thus, the transitory productivity shocks are more likely to be treated as noises.
With perfect information, agents do not respond to any noise shocks. With an imperfect
information environment, noise shocks generate short-term fluctuations. With Bayesian
18
Figure 1.3: Impulse Responses to Transitory Productivity Shock
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learning, agents quickly recognize the disturbance is just noise, so responses die out very
fast. When σst is high, responses to noise shock are more persistent, and die out slowly.
1.4.4 Business Cycle Moments
I report the model-implied moments of macroeconomic quantities and asset prices from the
baseline model in Table 1.2. The moments in actual data are estimated using quarterly
US time series data of GDP, consumption, investment and employment from the period
1948:I to 2014:IV. Further details of variables’ definition and construction may be found
in the Appendix. The model matches the key moments of the US data closely. For the
simulated data, the table shows the mean values across simulations, along with the 5th and
95th percentile values in brackets.
For most of the moments of interest, the range of empirical estimates falls inside the
90 percent confidence intervals generated by the model. The volatility of output growth
is 1.53%, compared with 1.38% in the data. But the volatility of investment growth and
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Figure 1.4: Impulse Responses to Noise Shock
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consumption growth in the model are a little bit off their empirical counterpart. The ratio of
consumption growth volatility to output growth volatility is 0.61, and the ratio of investment
growth volatility to output growth volatility is 3.40. The implied levered equity premium
of the model is 4.23%, matching the historical mean of the CRSP stock market log excess
returns.
1.5 Asset Pricing Implication
The goal of this section is to explore asset pricing implications from the model. To do so,
I first derive the price of information friction shock from the model solutions. IFS carries a
negative price of risk. Then I investigate the mechanism of generating a negative price of
risk by showing the impulse responses to the information friction shocks.
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Table 1.2: Business Cycle Moments - Baseline Model
Data Model
Macroeconomic Quantities
σ[∆y] 1.38% 1.53%
[1.41% 1.67%]
σ[∆c]/σ[∆y] 0.37 0.61
[0.54 0.68]
σ[∆i]/σ[∆y] 3.45 3.40
[3.20 3.62]
σ[∆l]/σ[∆y] 0.37 0.67
[0.64 0.72]
Asset Prices
E[rt − rft ] 4.09% 4.23%
[3.65% 4.83%]
σ[rt − rft ] 15.80% 18.50%
[16.74% 20.10%]
Note – The table compares moments of the data to simulated
moments from the baseline model. I consider log output growth
variability, relative variance of consumption to output, relative
variance of investment to output, relative variance of labor to
output, equity premium, and equity excess return volatility. Mo-
ments of actual data are estimated using quarterly US time series
data of GDP, consumption, investment and employment from
1948:I to 2014:IV. Moments of simulated data from the model
are at quarterly frequency. I report mean moments, along with
the 5th and 95th percentiles across 1,000 simulations, each with
a length of 50 years.
1.5.1 Price of Risk
The innovations to the stochastic discount factor are important as they characterize the risks
that affect investors’ marginal utility and determine risk compensation. To pin down the
price of information friction shock risk, I express the innovations to the log of stochastic
discount factor mt ≡ log(Mt) from the model solutions.
mt − Et−1 [mt] = −λgˆt gˆt − λzˆt zˆt − λft ft − λstηst (1.41)
Since I am interested in the price of risk associated with information friction, I focus on
the λst part. I solve the model with 3rd-order perturbation; therefore, the price of risk is
time-variant, and λst includes the 2nd-order cross terms among all the state variables and
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exogenous shocks in the model. Here I consider the unconditional mean of the λst . In such
a way, all the interaction terms are eliminated, leaving only a constant term.
λ¯s ≡ E [λst ] = −0.0032 (1.42)
Note that this approach is essentially the same as solving the model with 1st-order pertur-
bation, or the log-linearization technique. The price of information friction risk is negative.
A positive shock to the information friction induces the marginal utility of consumption to
increase, i.e. in a bad state of world. On average, the price of risk for one standard deviation2
shock to the information friction is 0.32%.
1.5.2 Mechanism Inspection
Figure 1.5 shows the impulse responses for six observed macro variables, as well as the
kernel and dividend, to one standard deviation of information friction shock. In response to a
positive shock to information friction, agents consume less, invest more, and work more hours.
As a result, capital and output increase and dividend drops significantly. However, agents’
marginal utility increases in response to a positive information friction shock. Dividend and
SDF move in opposite directions. This means dividend payments are low when agents are in
a bad state of world. Thus, dividend claim carries a positive risk premium associated with
information friction shock.
Financial friction also amplifies this co-movement effect. Information friction shocks and
financial friction shocks are negatively correlated in the model. A positive information fric-
tion shock also decreases the ξt, as shown in Figure 1.5. Note, the lower ξt represents higher
capital adjustment costs. The friction in capital markets becomes more severe when in-
formation friction is high. On average, dividend drops more when capital market friction
is higher. In Figure 1.6, I plot the impulse responses of SDF and dividend to the infor-
mation friction shock, under two scenarios. Dividend is more volatile when the correlation
between information friction and financial market friction is higher. There is vast evidence
in the literature that investigating the relationship between capital markets and imperfect
information showing external financing is more expensive with the existence of asymmetrical
information. To sum up, the interaction between information friction and financial market
friction amplifies the effect of information uncertainty on asset valuations.
2All the shocks in the model are standardized normal shocks with unit variance.
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1.6 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I test the model’s asset pricing implication empirically. To do so, I construct
a proxy for information friction shock using Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) data
and measure of macroeconomic uncertainty from Jurado et al. (2015). Specifically, I first
construct the measure of belief dispersion from the SPF data; then, I orthogonalize the time
series of belief dispersion using estimates from Jurado et al. (2015) to control any effects
from the fundamental uncertainty channel. The remaining part is driven by the information
uncertainty channel; I attribute it as the proxy for information friction shock. With this
empirical proxy for information friction shock, I use Fama-French 25 size-value portfolios to
test whether IFS is a priced risk factor. The results show a significant negative price of risk
for these test assets. I also explore the cross-sectional return predictability using portfolio
sorts methodology. My main finding is that firms with high exposure to information friction
shock tend to have lower returns, on average, than firms with low information friction shock
exposure. This finding is consistent with the model prediction of negative price of information
friction risk.
1.6.1 Measure of Information Friction Shocks
The main interest of this paper is to study the uncertainty effect from the information
friction channel. In the set up of my model, time-varying information friction directly affects
agents’ a posteriori estimate variance. When the information friction becomes more severe,
agents are more unsure about true fundamental productivity and the variance of their beliefs
become wider. Thus, I first construct the measure of belief dispersion using the Survey of
Professional Forecasters data.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia provides extensive panel data on economic
variable forecasts by professional economists. Each economist is asked to forecast a large
set of macroeconomic and financial variables over the current quarter and the subsequent
four quarters. To ensure panelists have the same information set, the Philadelphia Fed
synchronizes the survey timing with the release of Bureau of Economic Analysis’ advance
report, which contains the first estimate of GDP from the previous quarter. After this report
is released to the public, the Philadelphia Fed sends out survey questionnaires with all recent
data from the advance report. Usually, the deadline for survey responses is set one or two
weeks before the second month of each quarter, and the Philadelphia Fed releases the survey
results at the end of second month of each quarter. Figure 1.7 shows the timing of the Survey
of Professional Forecasters.
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Although SPF provides forecasts over different horizons, I focus on the forecasts over the
current quarter, not any future quarters. The reason is imperfect information prevents the
agents from observing the true current state, not future states. The forecasts of future states
are more likely to be driven by the fundamental uncertainty, not imperfect information. As
shown in Figure 1.7, when economists are asked to forecast the current quarter GDP, they are
almost at the end of the second month of the current quarter. Therefore, a significant portion
of the individual-level forecast dispersion is due to information friction. To some extent, this
helps me control some fundamental uncertainty effects. SPF also provides forecasts of many
macroeconomic and financial variables. However, I focus on the nominal GDP because this
directly relates to the productivity in my model set up. As a result, the belief dispersion
series is constructed using the individual-level forecast of nominal GDP of the current quarter
from the SPF data. I define the belief dispersion (BD) as the difference between the 75 and
25 percentiles of logarithm of nominal GDP across all individual forecasts for each quarter.
For robustness check, I also consider the 80-20 and 90-10 dispersion measures. The results
do not change much.
BDt = Pctile(log(NGDPit), 75)− Pctile(log(NGDPit), 25) (1.43)
The cross-sectional forecasts dispersion is used in other studies as a proxy for macroeconomic
uncertainty, e.g. Bloom (2009), Bachmann et al. (2013) and Bali et al. (2014). In the model,
belief dispersion is driven by two channels: the information channel, and the fundamental
uncertainty channel. To get a clean proxy for information friction shocks, I orthogonalize
the measure of belief dispersion with a macro uncertainty proxy from Jurado et al. (2015).
Jurado et al. (2015) exploit a very rich data environment and provide direct estimates of
macroeconomic uncertainty (MU). I use two methods in this orthogonalization practice.
The first method is simply regressing belief dispersion (BD) over macro uncertainty (MU).
The information friction shocks (IFS) are defined as the residuals of this OLS regression.
BDt = βMUt + IFSt (1.44)
The second method involves two steps. In the first step, I get the unexpected change of
belief dispersion (BDS), and unexpected change of macro uncertainty (MUS), by fitting a
AR(1) regression of the BD and MU series. Then, in the second step, I regress MUS over
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BDS; the residuals are defined as information friction shocks (IFS).
BDt = ρBDt−1 +BDSt (1.45)
MUt = ρMUt−1 +MUSt (1.46)
MUSt = ρBDSt + IFSt (1.47)
The empirical results are not sensitive to the choice of these two methods. I report the result
with the second orthogonalization method. Note that all the residuals from OLS regressions
are standardized, so that BDS, MUS and IFS all have unit variance.
1.6.2 Risk Pricing
The model implies a negative price of information friction risk. I evaluate the performance of
the baseline model using 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolios as test assets.
I follow the two-pass regression procedure in Boguth and Kuehn (2013). First, for each test
asset, I obtain unconditional risk loadings from a time-series regression of excess returns on
information friction shock (IFS) and other factors, depending on the model specification.
In the second pass, I estimate the prices of risk by cross-sectionally regressing average excess
returns on the first-pass loadings. The results from the second-pass regression are reported
in Table 1.3. I consider several specifications. The results confirm that IFS is a negatively
priced factor. The Fama-French 3 factors specification explains the test asset returns with
an R2 of 69%. Adding the IFS factor into the Fama-French 3 factors specification improves
the explanatory power with an R2 of 78%. The last full model specification, including the
IFS factor, Fama-French 3 factors and momentum factor, achieves an R2 of 82%.
1.6.3 Portfolio Sort
I obtain risk loadings as slope coefficients from time-series regressions of individual stock
returns on information friction shocks, controlling the Fama-French 3 factors and the mo-
mentum factor. In particular, for each security, I estimate factor loadings in each quarter
using the previous 5 years of quarterly observations.
rit − rft = αit + βitIFSt + γitControlt + εit (1.48)
With the estimates of each stock’s risk loadings, I am able to test whether future returns
are predicted by the exposure to innovations in information friction, using the portfolio
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Table 1.3: IFS Pricing with Fama-French 25 Size-Value Test Portfolios
IFS MKT SMB HML UMD R2
Model I -0.344 9.27
(-1.53)
Model II -0.019 0.004 0.012 69.13
(-1.38) (2.65) (6.25)
Model III -1.490 -0.005 0.006 0.011 81.25
(-3.56) (-0.47) (4.56) (7.11)
Model IV -0.006 0.004 0.012 0.026 71.38
(-0.34) (2.60) (6.40) (1.17)
Model V -1.447 -0.001 0.006 0.011 0.020 81.62
(-3.36) (-0.04) (4.31) (7.02) (1.07)
Note – The table reports market prices of risk from quarterly cross-
sectional regressions of average excess returns on estimated factor
loadings, using Fama-French 25 size-value portfolios. The factors are
information friction shock (IFS), Fama-French 3 factors (MKT, SMB,
HML), and momentum factor (UMD). For each model, I report the
estimated prices of risk, and the R2. The t-statistics are reported in
parentheses.
sort methodology. To make an accurate estimate of the price of dispersion shock, I need
assets with substantial dispersion in their exposure to the dispersion shock. Thus, I create
portfolios of firms sorted on their past sensitivity to the dispersion shock, and focus on the
spread between highest and lowest decile portfolios. At the end of each quarter, I sort all
stocks into portfolios based on their estimated risk loadings from the time-series regression
(1.48). Portfolios are held for three months and re-balanced every quarter.
Table 1.4 shows the average excess returns and risk characteristics for the 10 portfolios
of stocks sorted on their past sensitivity to the information friction shock. First, these
portfolios display a declining pattern of average excess returns, ranging from 85 bps to 46
bps per month. Second, the volatility of these portfolios displays a U-shape from low decile
to high decile. The volatility in the middle is around 4.6 percent per month, where the
volatility of low and high portfolios is above 7.7 percent per month.
26
Figure 1.5: Impulse Responses to Information Friction Shock
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Figure 1.6: Impulse Response of SDF and Dividend to Information Friction Shock
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Figure 1.7: Timing of the Survey
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In the last column, I also report the excess returns of a long-short strategy that invests in
the high exposure portfolio and sells the low exposure portfolio. The average monthly returns
of this zero investment portfolio is -0.39%, yielding an annual return of around -5%. Cross-
sectional differences in returns might not be surprising if the IFS betas covary with other
variables known to predict returns. To mitigate this concern, I regress the portfolio returns
on the most commonly used factors, such as Fama-French 3 factors and the momentum
factor. The α and its t-statistic are also reported in Table 1.4. The long-short portfolio
earns a significant -55 bps excess return per month, or about -6.8% per annum.
1.7 Information Uncertainty and Fundamental Uncertainty
So far, I have shown the importance of stochastic information friction for capturing the
dynamics of real business cycle quantities and asset prices. The main mechanism is time-
varying information friction affecting agents’ a posteriori estimate variance. When infor-
mation friction becomes more severe, the agent is more unsure about the true fundamental
productivity, belief dispersion becomes wider, uncertainty becomes larger. Importantly, this
time-variant uncertainty feature is solely generated from the information channel; it is not
related to fundamental productivity uncertainty. In the baseline model, productivity uncer-
tainty is constant. In this section, I allow the fundamental productivity uncertainty to be
time-varying. As a result, time-variant uncertainty is generated from two channels.
Since the seminal work of Bloom (2009), a large and growing body of literature has studied
the effect of uncertainty shock in explaining macroeconomic dynamics. In this literature, the
information environment is usually perfect; agents know the fundamentals today, but are not
sure about the volatility of productivity tomorrow due to uncertainty shock. This clearly
differentiates from the information uncertainty channel. Information uncertainty from the
baseline model refers to agents’ belief uncertainty regarding the fundamentals today. To
better understand the time-varying uncertainty from these two channels, I build a DSGE
model with both information friction shocks and uncertainty shocks in next section.
1.7.1 Extended Model with Uncertainty Shock
As in my baseline model, the productivity at follows the process (1.3) with component xt
and transitory component zt. Permanent growth gt ≡ ∆xt follows the same AR(1) process
in (1.4).
at = xt + zt (1.49)
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gt = ρggt−1 + σg
g
t (1.50)
The transitory productivity zt follows a similar AR(1) process in (1.5), but with time-varying
σzt to incorporate the uncertainty shocks. Fundamental uncertainty level is perturbed by
i.i.d. standard normal shocks ηzt , with variance ω
2
z .
zt = ρzzt−1 + σztzt (1.51)
log(σzt) = (1− κa) log(σ¯z) + κa log(σzt−1) + ωaηat (1.52)
The information environment is still imperfect, and features time-varying frictions. As in my
baseline model, the agent observes at and an additional signal st, but is imperfectly informed
about the true decomposition of xt and zt.
st = xt + σst
s
t (1.53)
log(σst) = (1− κs) log(σ¯s) + κs log(σst−1) + ωsηst (1.54)
All the other setups are the same as the baseline model.
1.7.2 Quantitative Analysis
In this extended model, with both information friction shock and uncertainty shock, the
agent’s beliefs dispersion is time-varying and is affected by both shocks simultaneously. To
better understand this, I take a look at modified equations (1.37), (1.38) and (1.39) in agents’
Bayesian learning problem.
t = C
(
APt−1|t−1Aᵀ +BtQB
ᵀ
t
)
Cᵀ +DtRD
ᵀ
t
t = HtH
ᵀ
t
xt|t = Axt−1|t−1 +KtHtuˆt
Note that the matrix Bt is time-varying now. It contains σzt, which controls fundamental
uncertainty. The matrix Dt contains σst, which controls time-varying information friction.
Beliefs dispersion is affected by both Bt and Dt matrices. Figure 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 show
the beliefs dispersion against σst and σzt. Beliefs dispersion is a monotonically increasing
function of both information uncertainty and fundamental uncertainty.
The model is solved with a 3rd-order perturbation method. Table 1.5 summarizes the
full set of parameters used in this model. Most of the parameters remain the same as the
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Figure 1.8: Belief Dispersion in Permanent Component xt
Figure 1.9: Belief Dispersion in Growth Component gt
baseline model. Table 1.6 shows the ability of the extended model, with both information
friction shock and uncertainty shock, to match business cycle moments. The model matches
key moments of the US data closely as reported in the second column. Simulated moments
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Figure 1.10: Belief Dispersion in Transitory Component zt
from the baseline mode and extended model are reported in the third and fourth column.
For the simulated data, the table shows the mean values across simulations, along with the
5th and 95th percentile values in brackets. For most of the moments of interest, the range of
empirical estimates falls inside the 90 percent confidence intervals generated by the model.
To study the asset pricing implication of this extended model, I focus on the innovations
to the log of stochastic discount factor, which characterize the risk compensation in this
economy.
mt − Et−1 [mt] = −λgˆt gˆt − λzˆt zˆt − λft ft − λstηst − λat ηat (1.55)
I focus on the λst and λ
a
t terms, which determine the price of risk associated with information
uncertainty risk and fundamental uncertainty risk. Similarly, I examine the unconditional
mean of λst and λ
a
t .
λ¯s ≡ E [λst ] = −0.0025
λ¯a ≡ E [λat ] = −0.0025
Both information uncertainty and fundamental uncertainty carry a negative price of risk. A
positive shock to the information friction or fundamental uncertainty induces the marginal
utility of consumption to increase, i.e. in a bad state of world. On average, the price of risk
for one standard deviation shock to the information friction or fundamental uncertainty is
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Table 1.5: Parameterization - Extended Model
Parameters Symbol Value
Preference
Discount factor β 0.994
Risk aversion γ 8.0
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ 2.0
Leisure exponent in utility θ 0.36
Technology
Capital exponent in production α 0.34
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Deterministic growth rate µ 0.0049
Persistence of permanent productivity shock ρg 0.89
Volatility of permanent productivity shock σg 0.002
Persistence of transitory productivity shock ρz 0.89
Volatility of transitory productivity shock σz 0.015
Capital adjustment cost ξ¯ 20.0
Persistence of financial friction shock ρf 0.80
Volatility of financial friction shock σf 0.04
Operating cost ι 0.0018
Wage adjustment cost ξw 15.0
Persistence of uncertainty shock κa 0.90
Volatility of uncertainty shock ωa 0.02
Information Friction
Average level of information friction σ¯s 0.0147
Persistence of information friction shock κs 0.90
Volatility of information friction shock ωs 0.02
Correlation
Corr(ηst , 
f
t ) %
sf -0.70
Corr(ηat , 
f
t ) %
af -0.70
0.25%. Under the assumptions of this extended model, both information uncertainty and
fundamental productivity uncertainty contribute 50% to the total uncertainty risk in this
economy.
1.7.3 Social Welfare
To examine any policy implication, I plot the social welfare over [σst σzt] space under average
economic conditions in Figure 1.11. High information friction decreases social welfare. A
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Table 1.6: Business Cycle Moments - Extended Model
Model
Data Baseline Extended
Macroeconomic Quantities
σ[∆y] 1.38% 1.53% 1.54%
[1.41% 1.67%] [1.41% 1.69%]
σ[∆c]/σ[∆y] 0.37 0.61 0.62
[0.54 0.68] [0.54 0.68]
σ[∆i]/σ[∆y] 3.45 3.40 3.39
[3.20 3.62] [3.18 3.64]
σ[∆l]/σ[∆y] 0.37 0.67 0.67
[0.64 0.72] [0.62 0.73]
Asset Prices
E[rt − rft ] 4.09% 4.23% 4.27%
[3.65% 4.83%] [3.41% 5.01%]
σ[rt − rft ] 15.80% 18.50% 18.52%
[16.74% 20.10%] [16.58% 20.68%]
Note – The table compares moments of the data to simulated moments from the baseline and
extended models. I consider log output growth variability, relative variance of consumption
to output, relative variance of investment to output, relative variance of labor to output,
equity premium, and equity excess return volatility. Moments of actual data are estimated
using quarterly US time series data of GDP, consumption, investment and employment from
1948:I to 2014:IV. Moments of simulated data from the model are at quarterly frequency.
I report mean moments, along with the 5th and 95th percentiles across 1,000 simulations,
each with a length of 50 years.
clear policy implication is to reduce the information uncertainty and enhance social welfare.
Increasing the quality of public news, increasing the accuracy of public reports, increasing
transparency, and reducing policy uncertainty are all effective ways to reduce information
uncertainty or costs associated with information acquisition in the economy. Reducing in-
formation friction is always better because agents make more efficient allocation decisions.
1.8 Conclusion
In an economy with a time-varying imperfect information environment, rational agents’
beliefs, with Bayesian learning, feature time-variant second moments. This creates belief
uncertainties from the information channel. I investigate the effect of stochastic information
friction by analyzing a DSGE model with Epstein-Zin preferences. In particular, the inter-
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Figure 1.11: Social Welfare
action between imperfect information and financial market friction provides an important
channel to amplify the effect of information uncertainty. Information friction shocks carry
a negative price of risk. This source of risk also harms social welfare by preventing efficient
allocation. A policy implication from the model is to reduce information uncertainty or costs
associated with information acquisition, thus enhancing market allocation efficiency.
Empirical evidence supports the asset pricing prediction from the DSGE model. I con-
struct an empirical measure to proxy for information friction shocks. Innovation to infor-
mation uncertainty is a negatively priced source of risk for a wide variety of test portfolios.
Cross-sectionally, exposure to information uncertainty risk strongly predicts future asset re-
turns. Firms with high exposure to information friction shock generate significantly lower
returns than firms with low information friction shock exposure. The estimated risk pre-
mium associated with information friction shock is negative and statistically significant. A
mimicking portfolio, IFS factor, generates 6% excess return per annum.
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CHAPTER 2
WHAT DRIVES INDEX OPTIONS EXPOSURE?
2.1 Introduction
Options on the market portfolio play a key role in capturing investor perception of systematic
risk. As such, these instruments are the object of extensive study by both academics and
practitioners. An enormous literature is concerned with modeling the prices and returns
of these options and analyzing their implications for aggregate risk, preferences and beliefs.
Yet, perhaps surprisingly, almost no literature has investigated basic facts about quantities
in this market. How much do investors actually use these contracts, and why?
This study addresses these questions by documenting historical patterns in the aggregate
demand for (and supply of) S&P 500-based options. We establish primary properties about
the level, trend, and the drivers of variation in index options exposure.
While theories of option demand have been proposed for over 40 years, little is known
about why index options are traded in practice.1 In classical models, derivatives are re-
dundant assets whose quantities are essentially indeterminate. Positive net demand arises
with heterogeneous agents in the presence of frictions or market incompleteness. Examining
demand patterns empirically may thus be informative about the relevant type and degree
of heterogeneity, frictions, and incompleteness. Since index options effectively reference, the
’market portfolio’, these elements are potentially primitive features of the economy that may
be fundamental in understanding asset pricing.
To guide our empirical investigation, Table 1 summarizes three potentially distinguishable
families of theories of option demand. We identify these by the type of risk transfer that
motivates the demand (first row) and the nature of the heterogeneity across agents that
drives trade (second row). The hypotheses are not meant to be exhaustive. However, they
represent distinct economic notions that may suggest differing predictions.
1By contrast, a substantial empirical literature starting with Easley et al. (1998) examines quantities of
individual firm options, focusing on the role of private information. Recent contributions include Lakonishok
et al. (2007) and Roll et al. (2010). One would expect private information to play little role in index options
markets.
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Table 2.1: Option Demand Hypotheses
(1) (2) (3)
Risk: Market risk Unspanned market risk Higher moment risk
(spanned) (e.g. jump risk) (e.g. volatility risk)
Heterogeneity: trading costs; beliefs;
portfolio constraints preferences;
background risk;
portfolio constraints
Potential commissions; spreads; risk measures;
covariates: information technology; volume; disagreement;
retail participation wealth shares
Likely preferred high elasticity; low strike price high volatility
types of option: at-the-money sensitivity
Column (1) describes theories in which options are used to transfer risk associated with
the level of aggregate wealth. As discussed by Black (1975) and emphasized by practitioners,
options may present a cost or efficiency advantage for such transfer when some agents face
frictions like costly borrowing, short-sale constraints, or transactions costs in the underlying
market. (This type of demand can exist even under the complete-market assumptions that
support classical option pricing theories, since the theories only require that some agents face
frictionless markets.) If these factors are important, one would expect variation in options
usage to correlate with variation in measures of transaction costs. Moreover, since these
costs are highest for individuals, options usage might be expected to vary with the level of
retail participation.
Since at least Ross (1976) and Hakansson (1978) economists have appreciated that perfect
markets fully spanned by the ability to trade in an underlying index asset is an abstraction,
and that options may therefore play a real role in completing markets. Much work has
focused on the case of jump-diffusion processes, emphasizing the role of options as hedges
for downside jumps (i.e., crashes). But even a simple two-period economy (as in Grossman
and Zhou (1996)) there will be unspanned risk with more than two market outcomes.
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The second column (2) describes theories of this type. There is a very broad range of
models, both partial and general equilibrium, encompassing investors who differ on a number
of different dimensions.2 Most work considers heterogeneity in beliefs or preferences. But
demand can also be driven by differences in such factors as background risk or portfolio
constraints, which may be indistinguishable from preference differences.3
Column (3) describes models also concerned with the transfer of unspanned risk, but
not of the market return itself, but of the return’s second (or higher) moments. Models of
unspanned stochastic volatility have been used in practice since the 1980s. More recently,
much work in asset pricing has explored the implications of nonstandard preference theories,
such as those of Epstein and Zin (1989), in which agents’ utility may directly depend on
higher-order risks. As with column (2), this type of unspanned risk could be combined with
numerous types of heterogeneity to generate net option demand.4
For either type of unspanned risk transfer (columns (2) and (3)), a natural hypothesis is
that the quantity of options should fluctuate with the degree of risk.5 Our empirical work
will employ a number of recently developed proxies for different dimensions of economic
risk. Similarly, measures that reflects changes in the degree of heterogeneity of the investor
population may explain option usage. We have some candidate proxies for disagreement,
sentiment (or risk-aversion). Moreover, with any type of heterogeneity, the degree of trade
will vary with the relative wealths of the subsets of agents who are trading. We examine
time variation in the composition of the U.S. investor population (households versus different
institutions) as a potential driver of options trends.
Finally, the last row of the table is motivated by the observation that different reasons
for option usage will be reflected in different types of options being preferred by investors.
For example, if cost considerations in gaining market exposure are an important factor, then
investors may prefer options with maximium elasticity (“bang for the buck”) either on the
long or short side. Alternatively, they may prefer options whose liquidity is highest, which are
typically those at-the-money. By contrast, if investors are concerned with unspanned crash
risk, demand would be expected to be concentrated in out-of-the-money puts. Whereas,
if volatility risk transfer is an important motivation for trade, one might expect that most
2Partial equilibrium models go back to Leland (1980) and Brennan and Solanki (1981). See also Carr
et al. (2001). Recent general equilibrium contributions include Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) and Bhamra and
Uppal (2009).
3See Franke et al. (1998) and Vanden (2004).
4Recent models of heterogeneity in perception of (and/or aversion to) stochastic volatility or time-varying
disaster risk include Bates (2008) and Chen et al. (2012).
5Since Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), a large body of work has explored conditions under which demand
for insurance increases with risk. See also Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2000). With both supply and demand
effects, the sign of the effect on quantity is indeterminate.
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activity would be in long-dated options, whose volatility sensitivity (“vega”) is highest.
To be clear, the goal of our study is to let the data speak to us on high-level issues, as
suggested by the table. We do not aim to structurally test particular models, few of which
have been developed to the point where they might reasonably be brought to the data.
(And, as discussed above, many distinct models may, in fact, have similar empirical impli-
cations.) Instead, we view our contribution as laying the groundwork for future theoretical
and empirical work on this topic.
For econometric clarity, our work proceeds by first documenting the scale of the index
options market, then modeling its stochastic trend, and finally explaining variation from
that trend. Our findings may be summarized as follows.
The overall size of the options market is small in terms of the aggregate value of contracts
and their gross exposure to volatility risk. On the other hand, the market is large in the sense
that market jumps have the potential to induce substantial exposures and economically large
rehedging demands. Our findings about market scale appear to be robust to consideration
of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, non-US contracts, and listed volatility derivatives.
Examination of options usage by type reveals that almost half of open interest is concen-
trated in out-of-the-money puts. This is strong evidence in favor of the unspanned crash-risk
story for options usage. By contrast, volatility risk transfer would appear less important,
as long-dated, at-the-money options (i.e., those with high volatility exposure) are a small
component of open interest.
Over time, the scale of positions in index options is nonstationary. The outstanding
number of contracts was quiet in the mid 1990s, rose substantially prior to 2007 and has
since stagnated. The nonstationarity is well explained by the stochastic trend in stock market
turnover, affirming the intuition above that trading volume impounds both the degree of
investor heterogeneity and the evolution of financial transactions technology. On the other
hand, we do not find that changing composition of the investor population can account for
the evolution of options usage. Nor do the level of interest rates and information technology
costs account for the trend in options positions.
The most significant determinant of fluctuations in detrended options positions is a neg-
ative response to risk, which is not driven by the risk-aversion component in measures of
investor sentiment, nor by differences of opinion. Increases in belief dispersion and deterio-
ration of investor sentiment induce significant positive responses of aggregate open interest.
There is also evidence of a positive quantity response to some measures of tail risk.
The primary finding of a strong negative response to risk is suggestive of a story in which
one set of agents (e.g., dealers) have tolerance for unspanned crash risk that is higher than
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that of another class (e.g., investors) in normal times, but which diminishes rapidly in the
face of rising risk, possibly due to binding position constraints or wealth effects.
In all, we succeed to a large degree in answering the question in the paper’s title: our
empirical descriptions of aggregate options measures achieve high explanatory power. Fluc-
tuations in equity market activity and different dimensions of risk drive most of the variation
in options quantities.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews the products with which
the study will be concerned, addresses some conceptual issues in the measurement of options
positions, and describes our aggregate exposure variables. Section 3 presents our basic
findings for levels and economic magnitude of options quantities. Section 4 addresses the
trend in the data via a cointegration analysis with potential nonstationary factors. Section 5
then investigates determinants of deviations from the fitted trend. A final section summarizes
the findings and highlights issues for future research that our study raises.
2.2 Measuring Index Options Quantities
This section describes the options series that we construct and discuss some conceptual issues
in aggregation. We also describe the most important sources of exposure that our measures
do not capture.
Options on stock indexes have traded on exchanges in the U.S. since the early 1980s. Our
goal is to study historical trends in this activity, and therefore we focus on a single underlying
index – the S&P 500 – to ensure consistency over time. We are thus omitting options on
other indexes that have, at one time or another, enjoyed a degree of popularity.6 Even
within the set of products referencing the S&P 500, there has been a lot of variation in, and
competition among, the products available for trade and their relative market shares. Our
data consists of three classes of products, whose differing trade and settlement mechanism
makes them not literally fungible, but which are essentially equivalent economically, allowing
us to aggregate our measures across them. The products we use are the following:
• CBOE S&P 500 Index (SPX) Options.
• CME S&P 500 Futures Options.
• Options on SPDR ETFs (SPY).
6Today the most liquid U.S. index products other than those referencing the S&P 500 are those on the
NASDAQ 100. Other index products that have been important in the past include those on the Value Line
index, the AMEX Major Market index, the Dow-Jones 30, the Russell 5000, and the S&P 100.
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Appendix A.1 provides institutional details on each of these contract types and on the
data we have for each.
As described in the introduction, our interest is in quantifying the extent of demand for
index options as a distinct product class. At this point, it is worth considering conceptually
what it is that we would ideally like to measure. There are two important issues.
First, options obviously are not interchangeable. So how should positions of different
types be aggregated? In particular, call and put positions represent opposite exposures to
index returns. Our view is that the economically interesting feature of options positions
is the nonlinearity that is common to both products however. We are not attempting to
measure directional exposure. Therefore we will treat puts and calls interchangeably, and
sum their gross positions. As a robustness check, and to gain further insight into demand
characteristics, we will also report results for separate buckets of options classes (calls/puts;
at/in/out of the money; short/long expiration horizon).
Obviously, our measures will be of gross positions, since net options positions are always
identically zero. This brings us to the second important issue in aggregation: hedging. Our
data are comprehensive over time and across products, but they contain no information on
net holdings of particular investors or investor class.7 We have no way of quantifying the
extent to which participants may cancel the economic exposures of their options positions.
For example, if a dealer buys a put and sells a call of the exact same expiration and maturity,
and then goes long the underlying asset, he effectively has no position in either option.
Similar remarks apply to options spread trades – being long and short similar but not
identical options.8
Since clearly many options markets participants hedge to some degree, this means that
our exposure measures may overstate actual economic exposures. However, this caveat itself
requires a caveat. Not all kinds of hedging distort the interpretation of gross exposures.
In particular, delta hedging – cancelling the directional risk of an options position – is not
problematic for us as it leaves intact the essential “option-ness”, or convexity, of the position.
For example, if a market participant buys a zero-delta straddle, we do want to measure that
as an open position.
7There are data sets of option trade by customer type covering some of our index contracts during some
periods. These can shed direct light on questions of why specific investors trade specific types of contracts.
See Garleanu et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2014) and Lemmon and Ni (2014) for recent contributions in this
direction.
8Our data do, however, take into account literally off-setting positions. All the options in our study are
centrally cleared. Reported open interest is netted by the clearing house at the account level. If a market
maker buys an option from one customer and sells the exact same option to another, then, the recorded
position is the same as if the two customers had traded with each other. This is typically not the case in
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets. We discuss OTC markets further below.
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Moreover, hedging by one party to an options trade does not by itself nullify the economic
impact of the position. It may merely transfer it to whomever the hedging trade is done with.
If a dealer buys a call (and sells the underlying) to hedge a short put position, certainly he is
effectively out of the position. But unless the call and put position are both with the same
counterparty, then someone has assumed the convexity of the original position by selling the
put. And, again, we would want to measure that. In the extreme case, it is possible that all
options market participants hedge all their convexity (i.e. with each other). But presumably
this class of derivatives would not exist if there was not some underlying demand for the
nonlinearity of the exposure they afford.
We can now describe the exact construction of the main measures that we will study. Our
primary benchmark is simply gross open interest, which provides a non-monetary measure
of the total amount of options outstanding. This is calculated as
OI(t) =
∑
i
CMi OIi(t), (2.1)
where CMi (contract multiplier) denotes the number of equivalent index units referenced
by a single option of i’s type, OIi(t) (open interest) is the number of option of i’s type
outstanding on date t, and the sum runs over all option types. This measure is in index
equivalent units, or “shares” of the S&P 500. Multiplying OI(t) by the level of the index
on date t gives a measure of the total monetary value of shares underlying all outstanding
options. The latter is effectively the definition of the “notional value” of these derivatives.
A second basic measure of of outstanding options is simply their aggregate market value,
or:
MV (t) =
∑
i
CMi OIi(t) Pi(t). (2.2)
where Pi(t) is the closing price of the ith option-type. This measure is in units of dollars. It
quantifies the gross investment of agents in this product. If all options were somehow voided
(e.g., through a clearing-house default) or expired worthless this is the amount that would
be lost. Since option values all scale with the level of the underlying, this measure, when
compared to the monetary value of the index itself, yields a normalized average contract
value.
To measure the gross risk characteristics of options positions, we next introduce two
weighted average measures: aggregate vega and aggregate gamma of outstanding con-
tracts.
A standard quantification of the volatility exposure of an option, “vega” is market parlance
for the change in the option’s value – according to a benchmark model – when the underlying
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annualized volatility is perturbed by 0.01 (one “vol”). If vi(t) represents the partial derivative
of the ith option-type (underlying, strike, expiration) on date t, then our aggregate measure
is:
AV (t) = 0.01
∑
i
CMi OIi(t) vi(t). (2.3)
We follow market practice here, using benchmark Black and Scholes (1973) or binomial
models for European and American options respectively.9 By definition, vi(t) measures the
change in the option’s value in response to a change in implied volatility. We note that
this is not necessarily how much the option’s value will change in response to a change in
actual return volatility. However, AV does give a direct quantification of the gross amount
of volatility risk transfer achieved in the index options market. Like MV it is in dollars.
Similarly, “gamma” is market parlance for the model-based sensitivity of the equivalent
share exposure (the “delta”) of an options position to a $1 move in the underlying index.
We convert this to an equivalent change per 1% move in the underlying via multiplying the
partial derivative, Γi(t), by .01S(t) and then summing:
AG(t) = 0.01
∑
i
CMi OIi(t) Γi(t) S(t). (2.4)
This measure gives the total index equivalent units that would have to be traded (in absolute
value) if all options positions were re-hedged to market neutrality in response to a one
percent index change. It can be expressed as a turnover ratio by dividing by the total index
equivalent units outstanding, defined to be simply the total monetary value of the index
stocks (weighted by their index share) divided by the level of the index. As described in the
next section, AG, can also be related to the total monetary exposure of options positions to
the risk of a jump in the index.
Before turning to the data, it is worthwhile to consider briefly what can be said about
stock index options not captured by our measures.
We have already alluded to various other U.S. listed index options that have not been
consistently successful. However, it is reasonable to wonder how important they might be
collectively. The same question could be asked about index options products listed on non
U.S. exchanges, referencing the Nikkei 225 or the FTSE 100 for example. Finally, there are
active non-listed OTC index options markets that are not in our measures.
For aggregate information on all of the above products, we will compare our numbers to
those reported in a semi-annual survey undertaken by the Bank for International Settlement
9The computation is numerically challenging for large numbers of American options. Details of an efficient
numerical procedure are given in the appendix.
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(BIS) since 1996. The BIS numbers for exchange-traded options are computed from sources
similar to ours, whereas the OTC numbers are estimated based on reports to the BIS from
member central banks.10 There are issues in comparing OTC numbers to exchange-traded
ones. In particular, OTC positions are rarely netted, and are typically cleared bilaterally.
This means that amounts outstanding are greatly overstated compared to the equivalent
numbers from exchanges. Moreover, the BIS does not correct for double counting of options
positions open between reporting banks. This contributes further to the inflation of OTC
statistics.11 For these reasons, it would be inappropriate to literally combine our measures
with the BIS numbers.
Finally, to the extent that our study is concerned with volatility risk transfer, a question
arises as to what extent participants have utilized direct volatility derivatives to accomplish
this. Investment banks have actively quoted market in variance swaps and other similar
products for at least the last 20 years. Unfortunately, we do not know of any sources of
data on quantities of OTC volatility derivatives. However recent years have seen a rise in
popularity of listed volatility derivatives, especially futures tied the CBOE implied volatility
index, VIX. We have data on these contracts, and we discuss their magnitude in the next
section.
2.3 The History of Index Options Quantities
Figures 2.1-2.4 plot the time series of our measures, showing the contributions of the three
contracts separately. (The plots are in logarithms.) By all measures, the dominant class has
been the CBOE SPX options. Futures options achieved nearly equal market share briefly
in the mid 1990s but have since fallen back. The SPY contracts have grown rapidly and
now rival the CME products in terms of open interest and gamma, although their monetary
value and vega remains negligible.
All the series are clearly nonstationary. There has been a strong upward trend historically.
However there have also been extensive periods of stagnation, including the later 1990s and
the period following the financial crisis. We attempt to identify exogenous drivers of these
trends in the next section.
In terms of economic magnitudes, the numbers reveal an interesting contrast: the options
market is small in monetary value, but large in terms of potential value as measured by
10The survey originally covered banks in the G10 countries, and currently covers 13 countries. The coverage
within countries depends on the reporting requirements of each central bank.
11To give a numerical example, suppose Dealer A sells a customer a quantity Q of an option, and buys an
off-setting position from Dealer B. Then the BIS survey will see this as open positions of 3Q – 2Q reported
by A and 1Q by B. In a centrally cleared market the open interest would be recorded as Q.
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Figure 2.1: Total Open Interest
The top line is the total open interest of all outstanding SPX options listed on the CBOE. The
middle line is the open interest of all CME-listed options on S&P 500 futures. The lowest line is
the open interest of all options on SPDR ETFs. The units are logarithms of index equivalent units.
the number of shares referenced. Table 2.2 reports the series values as of the end of the
sample 12/31/2012 as well as on the highest recorded day of AV which was 9/22/2008. For
reference, the first and fourth columns give the size of the S&P 500 in (respectively) billions
of dollars and billions of equivalent shares outstanding. (The latter is defined as the former
divided by the nominal index level.)
From the second column, the total value of all S&P 500 options is less than $100 billion,
about the scale of a single mid-sized company. The capitalization of the market itself is two
orders of magnitude larger. In terms of risk transfer, the vega numbers in the third column
indicate that, again, investors have not insured much exposure. An aggregate vega value of
$2 billion means that a doubling of return volatility, e.g. from 20% to 40%, would transfer
an economically negligible $40 billion from option writers to option purchasers.
On the other hand, from the fifth column, the number of shares referenced by index
options are a nonnegligible fraction of the total equity of the market. The small monetary
value and vega, then, are indications that most option positions are short-term and/or
out-of-the-money. The sixth column indicates that aggregate gamma is high in the sense
that a one percent move in the market could induce rehedging demands that correspond
to approximately one percent of shares outstanding. This may not seem large until one
recognizes that total turnover of the U.S. equity markets averages well less than one percent
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Figure 2.2: Market Value
The top line is the total market value of all outstanding SPX options listed on the CBOE. The
middle line is the market value of all CME-listed options on S&P 500 futures. The lowest line is
the market value of all options on SPDR ETFs. The units are logarithms of dollar value.
of shares outstanding on any given day. Thus options positions are quite large economically
in terms of their potential to transfer risk. While we know it is not the case, as emphasized
above, that long options positions and short option positions are held by disjoint sets of
agents, even if only a fraction induce rehedging, the response to, say, a 10 percent index
move could strain market liquidity.12
Table 2.3 shows the average fraction of open interest represented by 12 types of option:
calls and puts, separately classified as short or long term depending on whether the expiration
is under or over 40 days away, and classified as in-, at, or out-of-the-money based on Black-
Scholes delta cutoffs (in absolute value) of 0.375 and 0.625. (The table restricts attention to
the dominant SPX class of options.)
Investor positions are concentrated in out-of-the-money puts. As of the end of the sample
these constituted more open interest (51 %) than all other types combined. Note that, by
put-call-parity, the exposure transferred by low strike calls is essentially the same as that of
low strike puts.
While longer term options represent about two thirds of open interest, short term options
are traded about twice as often relative to their open interest. This is shown in the second
12Of course, if long and short gamma players both maintain delta-neutral positions, then their rehedging
demands would offset, i.e., they could always trade with each other. In practice, market-makers – who tend
to be short gamma – are more likely to rehedge than are end users.
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Figure 2.3: Aggregate Vega
The top line is the total volatility sensitivity of all outstanding SPX options listed on the CBOE.
The middle line is the volatility sensitivity of all CmME-listed options on S&P 500 futures. The
lowest line is the volatility sensitivity of all options on SPDR ETFs. The units are logarithms of
dollar value per 100 basis point change in annualized volatility.
panel, which compares trading volume to the (absolute value) of open interest changes. A
value of three, for example, indicates that a third of trades alter investors’ net exposure.
The picture of a market dominated by low strike price put positions is consistent with index
options being used primarily for crash insurance. Indeed, the amount of crash insurance can
be quantified with our aggregate gamma numbers. For any position hedged with respect to
market direction, the leading term in a Taylor series expansion for the change in position
value in response to a jump of size j is
1
2
Γ j2
where Γ is the second partial derivative of the position value with respect to the underlying.
Aggregating this quantity as of December 2012, Figure 2.5 shows the potential monetary
transfer as a function of the jump percentage. For moderate jumps, the number is in the
hundreds of billions of dollars and approaches trillions for a severe crash. In fact, in the case
of a downward jump this number is an understatement since we know from above that most
open positions are out-of-the-money puts. The graph also shows the change in position value
when the agggregate position is approximated as a three-month put with strike chosen to
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Figure 2.4: Aggregate Gamma
The top line is the total delta sensitivity of all outstanding SPX options listed on the CBOE. The
middle line is the delta sensitivity of all CmME-listed options on S&P 500 futures. The lowest line
is the delta sensitivity of all options on SPDR ETFs. The units are logarithms of index equivalent
units per one percent index change.
match the aggregate market value and gamma.13
Our findings on the economic magnitude of the index option market is not altered by the
consideration of the broader numbers in the BIS survey. Bearing in mind the difficulties in
comparison with OTC numbers previously described, we report in Table 2.4 the “notional”
amounts from the BIS of each class of derivative alongside our own aggregated number as of
December 2012. Notional amounts are the value of the underlying equity index referenced
by the outstanding options and thus correspond to our series OI(t) multiplied by S(t), the
value of the underlying index on each date14
The numbers in the table show that our study is not missing any significant U.S. listed
index options.15 Similarly, given the overcounting of OTC positions, the U.S. OTC index
exposure not captured in our data, while substantial, is at least not larger than the ones we
13In fact, both approximations are still understatements for a large move (in either direction) since such
a move would also substantially raise implied volatilities. We thank a referee for suggesting this analysis.
14In practice, OTC participants may report the notional amount as the value of the underlying stock on
each option at the exercise price. For example the right to buy $100 million dollars of stock at price K would
be equivalent to a listed option on $100 million-divided-by-K units which we would record as a notional
amount of (S/K) times $100 million, whereas OTC participants may report $100 million as the notional
value.
15The fact that our contracts appear to exceed the size of a set that strictly includes them may be due to
timing differences in data collection.
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Table 2.2: S&P 500 Options Quantities
end of sample – 12/31/2012
index index
cap MV AV shares OI AG
SPX 34.75 1.456 0.909 0.0264
futures 1.85 0.142 0.136 0.0046
SPY 0.38 0.023 0.183 0.0675
total 13121 36.98 1.621 9.200 1.229 0.0985
peak size – 09/22/2008
index index
cap MV AV shares OI AG
SPX 102.93 3.316 1.452 0.0250
futures 4.56 0.213 0.204 0.0041
SPY 1.09 0.036 0.147 0.0325
total 10836 108.57 3.566 8.980 1.804 0.0615
The table reports option quantity measures on two dates. For comparison, the first and fourth columns give
the capitalization of the S&P 500 (in billions of dollars) and the effective number of index shares outstanding
(in billions of index units) defined as the capitalization divided by the index level. Market value (MV ) and
aggregate vega (AV ) are in billions of dollars. Open interest (OI) and aggregate gamma (AG) are in billions
of index-equivalent units.
cover. Last, non U.S. index options, listed and OTC, are comparable in size to our data set.
The previous section also noted the emergence of listed derivatives on stock market volatil-
ity as a related and possible substitute product class. While volatility and variance swaps
have been actively traded in OTC markets for at least ten years, the first exchange-traded
products were cash-settled futures tied to the VIX index introduced in 2004.16 For unclear
reasons, investor interest in these products – and their liquidity – took off in the last few
years. By the design of these contracts, their open interest is directly comparable to our AV
measure of volatility exposure in the index options market.
Figure 2.6 shows our aggregate vega series both alone (solid line) and with the additional
total vega of the futures (dashed line) since 2009. As of the end of the sample, the difference
in the series is around 0.25, meaning that the futures account for about a fifth of the total
volatility exposure. We conclude that this exposure is comparatively substantial (and rapidly
growing growing), but is still small in economic magnitude.
16We are unaware of data series on quantities of OTC volatility derivatives.
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Table 2.3: S&P 500 Options Quantities by Type
Fraction of open interest
low strike at-the-money high strike
calls, long-term 0.0742 0.0660 0.1067
calls, short-term 0.0538 0.0206 0.0762
puts, long-term 0.2939 0.0597 0.0345
puts, short-term 0.1668 0.0196 0.0281
Average volume over change in open interest
low strike at-the-money high strike
calls, long-term 1.11 1.74 1.67
calls, short-term 2.95 2.98 3.23
puts, long-term 1.78 1.90 1.23
puts, short-term 3.17 3.10 2.78
The top panel table reports the average fraction of aggregate open interest in CBOE-listed SPX options
comprised of calls and puts; long (over 40 days) and short time to expiration; and strike prices below, near,
or above the current index level. The strike price breakpoints are determined by the Black-Scholes delta of
the respective options, with low strike puts having delta greater than -0.375, low strike calls having delta
greater than 0.625, high strike puts having delta less than -0.625, high strike calls having delta less than
0.375. The bottom panel shows time series averages of each month’s ratio of volume to absolute change in
open interest. The sample period is 1/5/1990 to 12/31/2012.
2.4 The Stochastic Trend in Options Exposure
We now turn to the question of characterizing the trend driving the evolution of options
exposure. An initial observation about the four series is that the stochastic component
appears to be common among them. If we express the gamma, vega, and market value series
on a per-contract basis by dividing by open interest, and also normalize the latter two series
by also dividing by the index level17, the resulting series (shown in logs in Figure 2.7) appear
stationary. Standard tests for unit roots reject the null of nonstationarity, consistent with
the visual impression.
From this analysis, it follows that the composition of the options outstanding in terms of
their convexity and market value is relatively stable over time. We can, therefore, focus our
attention on a single quantity series – aggregate open interest – in modelling the nonstation-
ary component of options positions. Note that OI, measured in index-equivalent units, is
not mechanically related to the level of the stock market or its volatility.
In seeking to explain the stochastic trend in OI, we refer to the hypotheses outlined in the
17Option values and vegas scale mechanically with the level of the underlying. With our unit definition of
gamma, that series does not scale with the underlying.
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Figure 2.5: Jump Risk
introduction and consider possible trends in investor heterogeneity and/or market frictions.
Here a natural prior hypothesis is to link options market trends to trends in other measures of
financial activity that are likely to be driven by the same forces. In particular, equity market
trading volume should also reflect differences in preferences and beliefs, as well as trends in
trading costs and technology in the financial industry. To formally assess the hypothesis,
we perform cointegration tests using the log of median daily turnover, TO, of stocks whose
primary listing is on the NYSE and American Stock Exchange;18
While detrending OI with equity market turnover will turn out to be successful, it does
raise the question of what drives turnover. That topic is itself an important open question
that is beyond the scope of the present work. However, it is reasonable to ask whether the
evolution of options exposures can be associated more directly with measures of population
heterogeneity or investment frictions. We propose a few ideas.
One hypothesis is that an important dimension of heterogeneity is of the type of investors
or institutions that are active in the market. Rather than attempt to find proxies for unob-
servable preferences or beliefs, this approach posits that these characteristics may be common
to a class of participants. Demand for and supply of options may then be associated with
changes in the relative size of different types of participants. We assess this hypothesis using
data from the Federal Reserve’s quarterly Z.1 reports on ownership of U.S. corporate equity.
From these, we construct the market share of five classes of participants: households, mutual
18The volume measures encompass trading consolidated across all exchanges, trading platforms, dark
pools, etc. The turnover series is computed as a trailing 21-day average, dropping days adjacent to holidays.
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Table 2.4: All Index Option Markets
Notional Amount Outstanding (USD billion)
listed S&P 500 U.S. listed non U.S. listed U.S. OTC non U.S. OTC
Dec, 2012 2320.0 1934.8 2005.8 1266.7 2940.2
The table reports outstanding amounts of equity index options as of December 2012. The first column
aggregates the contracts used in this study, and is a daily average over the month. The remaining columns
are from the BIS semi-annual derivatives surveys: http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm. For
the second and third columns, the U.S. numbers include North American exchanges. The OTC columns
count all equity options not just those referencing indices.
funds and ETFs, pension and insurance funds, foreign institutions, and brokerage firms and
securities dealers. Shares of equity ownership are, of course, not direct measures of the pop-
ulation of index options market participants. But it is certainly plausible that trends in the
two are closely related. Our tests assess whether the trend in OI is explained by the trend
share of any one of the five types.
Next, we consider potential measurement of investment frictions. Over the sample period,
the cost of transacting in the stock market declined dramatically for most investors due to
a combination of cheaper information processing, data availability, and competition among
intermediaries. Commissions and direct trading costs have trended strongly downwards
while market liquidity has trended upwards. Borrowing costs, another potential constraint
on trading activity, also trended strongly downward during the sample period.
Note that the theoretical prediction here would be that options demand would decline
with interest rates if investors use options precisely because of their embedded leverage.
Likewise, to the extent that the underlying markets for index stocks become cheaper to
trade, it becomes easier to replicate any nonlinear payoff achievable with options, suggesting
a decline in demand. On the other hand, clearly cheaper options trading itself would be
expected to increase options usage. Similarly improvements in trading infrastructure to
lower technological barriers to trading options should promote usage.
With these considerations in mind, we include in our analysis a measure of average trad-
ing costs in the options market, a general information processing proxy, and the 3-month
eurodollar interest rate. The trading cost proxy is an average of closing percentage bid/ask
spreads for the CBOE SPX options. The technology variable is an index of the cost of
household information technology, hardware and services compiled by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS).
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Figure 2.6: Listed Volatility Futures
The lower dashed line is the aggregate vega of listed S&P 500 options. The solid line includes the
contribution of listed futures on the VIX index. The units are logarithms of dollar exposures.
For each of the variables described above, we undertake a series of bivariate cointegration
tests with the time series of the log of aggregate open interest. Table 2.5 shows the resulting
test statistics for the null of no cointegration. Rejections are thus evidence of a common
stochastic trend.
The tests show positive evidence of a common stochastic trend between OI and TO, but
no evidence that any of the other variables shares a common trend with OI.19 Evidently, the
remaining variables fail to capture relevant dimensions of heterogeneity or costs that affect
options activity. The explanatory power of turnover cannot, then, be attributed to these
factors.20
While it remains an important and interesting topic to explain what exactly equity market
turnover is capturing, for present purposes the conclusion is that the same trend driving it
also drives options usage. Is reverse causality a possibility? We previously documented
that the scale of options position was large enough to potentially induce substantial equity
trade (via rehedging of delta-neutral positions). We are not able to measure actual options
hedging trades in the stock market. However we can measure trading that is not plausibly
19The Johansen statistics for the bid-ask series and the pension and insurance share are misleading because
this test considers arbitrary combinations of the two variables. Here the estimated weighting on OI in the
cointegrating vector is actually zero. The test is simply saying that the other two series on their own look
stationary. By contrast, the other two test statistics are based on regression residuals that take OI as the
dependent variable. The remaining variables examined in the table all pass standard unit root tests.
20This conclusion is robust to consideration of multivariate cointegrating relationships. Results are omitted
for brevity.
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Figure 2.7: Re-scaled Options Exposures
attributable to index options: namely, activity in non-index stocks. When we construct our
turnover measure using exclusively these stocks, the cointegration results are stronger than
those reported in the table.21 It is thus reasonable to conclude that the exogenous component
of equity market activity drives options positions.
To close this section, we consider whether our conclusions about the driving trends in
options exposure are likely to be sensitive to the omission of data from the OTC market.
Figure 2.8 compares the evolution of our aggregate open interest series with that of the
OTC series from the BIS, when the latter is expressed in terms of equivalent S&P 500
units. (Both series are in logs.) The two series track each other quite closely from 1998
21All three tests statistics reject at the 99% level. Results are available upon request.
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Table 2.5: Cointegration Analysis of Aggregate Open Interest
Variable: Phillips-Perron: Engle-Granger: Johansen:
financial activity
log TO -4.44*** -3.63** 14.70*
investor composition
shousehold -1.57 -1.57 6.41
sfunds -1.46 -1.19 5.37
spens+ins -2.03 -2.01 14.74*
sbroker -1.12 -1.04 10.01
sforeign -2.09 -1.90 9.71
frictions
bid/ask -1.52 -1.12 26.28***
CPIinfo -1.96 -1.43 11.80
rED3mo -0.69 -0.43 7.44
The table reports results of three cointegration tests for bivariate systems, the first element of which is the
log of the aggregate open interest in list S&P 500 options and the second element is the variable shown in
the first column. TO is the median daily turnover for the prior month of stocks whose primary listing is
the NYSE or AMEX. The investor composition variables, s, are the relative shares of each category in total
U.S. equity ownership as of the end of the previous quarter. bid/ask is the open-interest weighted average
closing percentage bid/ask spread of CBOE SPX options. CPIinfo is the real household cost of information
technology, hardware and services compiled by the BLS. rED3mo is the 3-month eurodollar interest rate. The
second column gives the test statistic for the test of Phillips-Perron (1988); the third column gives the test
statistic for the Engle-Granger (1988) test; the fourth column shows the Johansen (1991) trace test statistic.
One, two, and three asterisks denote rejection of the null of no cointegration at the 90%, 95% and 99%
thresholds, respectively. All tests use three months of daily lags. The sample period is January 5, 1990 to
December 31, 2012.
through 2006, coincidentally almost being equal in magnitude. However there has been a
pronounced erosion in the OTC market share in recent years. In raw terms, the OTC market
now accounts only half as much net notional exposure as the exchange-traded products.22
The graph suggests that combined index options positions from the two venues may have
declined more since 2007 than our exchange-traded series alone indicates. On the other hand,
22The gap between the series dates from the first half of 2007, prior to the financial crisis or to any
subsequent regulatory developments. A possible explanation may be the industry’s own emphasis on more
efficient trade netting and compression of OTC positions that had arisen from the soaring trade in credit
derivatives during the expansion preceding the crash.
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Figure 2.8: Aggregate Open Interest
The figure plots aggregate open interest for exchange-traded and over-the-counter U.S. equity index
options. The OTC series is from the BIS and is converted from net notional value into S&P 500
equivalent units. Both series are in logarithms.
the two series do move more-or-less in parallel from 2008 onwards. Thus we conclude that
our conclusions about the broad trends since 1990 are unlikely to be biased by the absence
of OTC data.
We have now answered an important part of the question in the paper’s title. There are
noteworthy findings, both positive and negative. We do not find support for theories that
posit that options usage is driven by borrowing constraints or relative transactions costs
vis a vis the underlying market. Nor are we able to associate options quantities with a
particular class of investor participation. Instead, we find the stochastic trend that drives
options positions is well described by that of equity market turnover. We have posited that
the latter trend reflects trends in heterogeneity in beliefs or preferences, as well as the cost
of trading. Substantiating that conjecture remains a topic for future research.
2.5 Risk and Index Options Quantities
We now turn to the topic of modelling options quantities in terms of their deviation from
the stochastic trend documented in Section 2.4. As discussed in the introduction, theoretical
considerations imply that the amount of risk transfer should vary with the degree of risk.
We therefore consider here a number of measures of different types of risk.
The dependent variable in this section is the stochastically detrended log open-interest
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series. Specifically, the full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimator for the coin-
tegrating coefficient in the Johansen (1991) estimation is approximately 1.70. So the finding
above is that logOI − 1.7 log TO is stationary. It is this difference that we study here.23
Our analysis reports results of levels regressions. These are consistent under the null of
stationarity.24 As a robustness check, in Appendix A.3, we report results of nonstationary
regressions in which turnover is on the right-hand side.
To start, we consider measures of investor perception of risk. We have two convenient time
series that characterize the most important features of the S&P implied volatility surface
since 1990. The well-known VIX series (the so-called new version) provides a model-free
estimate of risk neutral expected volatility for the next 30 days. More recently, the CBOE
has also constructed an analogous model-free estimate of the skewness of implied volatility.25
Since this skewness is typically negative (i.e. the return distribution is left-skewed) the CBOE
value has a minus sign in the definition. Moreover it is a measure of standardized skewness.
That is, the variance has been scaled out of it: the correlation of VIX and SKEW is -0.05.
This is by construction. A SKEW value of 120, for example, indicates intuitively that there
is 20 % more mass in the left tail than the right tail. It does not indicate an absolute amount
of probability in the left tail. We therefore interact VIX and SKEW to capture the latter
information as well.
Table 2.6 presents regressions of detrended log open-interest on these variables. The first
row shows that there is a significantly negative response of options quantities to VIX. This
effect is economically large. All variables are in logs, and the standard deviation of VIX is
approximately 0.35. So, using the smallest coefficient in the first column, a one standard
deviation increase in VIX implies a 15% decline in open interest, and this alone explains over
20 percent of the variability in OI.
When SKEW is included, in the second column, it too enters with a negative response,
although insignificantly. However this becomes very significant when the interaction term is
included (third column).The interaction of VIX and SKEW is positive and highly significant,
meaning that for large values of either variable, the marginal response to the other will be
positive. Figure 2.9 plots the two dimensional response surface over a range of approximately
±3 standard deviations of both independent variables. From the scale of the vertical axis,
the effects are economically large. For reference, the standard deviation of the dependent
23The series still contains a strong seasonal component, notably shrinking over the 4th quarter of each
year and rebounding in the 1st quarter. We remove this component in the regression analysis below by
subtracting the full-sample average growth rate for each quarter. There is also a small seasonal related to
the option expiration cycle. The results below are not sensitive to removing this component.
24Estimation error in the cointegrating relationship adds further noise to yt, which works against our
ability to detect significant covariates.
25Both series are available from http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/historical.aspx.
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variable is 0.39.
We will discuss the economic interpretation of these responses below. Intuitively, they tell
us that, under most market conditions, increases in variance and left-tail risk elicit negative
quantity responses. However, the effect may be reversed when both VIX and SKEW are
above their means, which can be viewed as times of high market stress.
The third column of the table adds another dimension of risk: the volatility of volatility.
The motivation for this variable is the theory that a primary purpose of index options may be
volatility risk transfer. We estimate this series by fitting an EGARCH model (Nelson (1991))
to daily changes in log of VIX itself26 We find an independent and statistically significant
positive response to this variable. High volatility of volatility again indicates conditions of
high market stress, in which both tails of the return distribution expand.
Figure 2.9: Effect of Risk On Options Quantities
The rightmost column augments the options-derived measures of risk perception with two
others recently introduced into the literature. Baker et al. (2013) compile the frequency
of articles combining terms related to uncertainty with terms related to government policy
from 10 U.S. newspapers. The authors show that their index is increasingly correlated with
measures of stock market implied volatility as the forecast horizon increases. In other words,
it may be seen as capturing long-term volatility as opposed to the 30-day horizon used in the
construction of VIX. Manela and Moreira (2015) similarly use a machine-learning algorithm
to identify uncertainty-relevant language appearing on the front pages of the Wall Street
26To perform this estimation on the longest possible time series, we create a new volatility proxy using
the CME data, which goes back to 1983. This series is constructed using a kernel density weighting of CME
option implied volatilities, wherein the weighting on moneyness and expiration are chosen to maximize the
fit to VIX in the post-1990 period. Details are available upon request.
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Table 2.6: Risk Effects in Index Option Quantities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VIX -0.5561 -0.5586 -1.6351 -1.6143 -1.4452
(4.00) (4.04) (7.41) (8.17) (6.15)
SKEW -0.3452 -20.5192 -18.9961 -10.3758
(0.47) (6.49) (6.58) (2.94)
VIX∗SKEW 6.8515 6.3512 3.5318
(6.64) (6.70) (2.98)
σV IX 0.3224 0.3849
(3.12) (4.91)
BBD -0.3055
(3.90)
MM 0.7652
(4.82)
R2 0.24 0.25 0.32 0.36 0.51
N 5776 5776 5776 5776 5042
The table shows OLS regressions of aggregate index option quantities on volatility statistics measures of
risk. The dependent variable is the log of aggregate open interest detrended as described in the text. VIX
and SKEW are model-free measures of the second and third moments of the option-implied distribution
of 30-day ahead index returns computed by the CBOE. σV IX is the daily estimated volatility of volatility.
BBD is a series from Baker et al. (2013) of intensity of economic policy news stories. MM is an index of
uncertainty news intensity used in Manela and Moreira (2015). All variables are in logarithms. Newey-West
(1987) t statistics (shown in parentheses) are computed with one year of lags. The sample period is January
5, 1990 to December 31, 2012.
Journal and tabulate its intensity.27 Based upon extensive analysis of drivers of variation
in their index, these authors argue that the component that is not related to stock market
uncertainty is strongly correlated with the probability of rare disasters.
Our regressions find independent and economically large explanatory power for both vari-
ables in explaining option quantities. The regression R2 now exceeds 50 percent. The signs
of the effects are opposite, despite the similarity of construction. Intriguingly, interpreting
each of the indexes as proposed by their creators, the message again seems to be of a negative
response to (long-horizon) variance, with a positive response to extreme stress (disasters).
To get a closer look at quantity responses to variance and skewness, we run similar regres-
sions for open interest of different types of options. Table 2.7 shows the dynamic responses
27We are grateful to the authors for making this series available to us.
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to VIX and SKEW of open interest for each of the 12 buckets defined in Section 3. To avoid
mechanical effects, these regressions are run in differences, holding the basket breakpoints
fixed across successive days.28 Open interest changes for each basket are expressed as a frac-
tion of the trailing 3-month average level of open interest in that basket. The table shows
the sum of the contemporaneous response and one-lag response coefficients.
Table 2.7: Risk Responses by Option Type
VIX
low strike at-the-money high strike
calls, long-term -0.1314*** 0.0080 0.0852***
calls, short-term -0.1683*** -0.0272 0.0409**
puts, long-term -0.0489*** 0.2112*** 0.0944***
puts, short-term 0.0213 0.3323*** 0.1414***
SKEW
low strike at-the-money high strike
calls, long-term 0.1060 0.1885** -0.1536**
calls, short-term 0.1343 0.2333** -0.2095***
puts, long-term -0.0872 0.1019 -0.0033
puts, short-term -0.0509 0.1357 -0.3374***
The table reports regressions of the change in open interest for options classified by type as described in the
caption to Table 2.3. The independent variables are the contemporaneous change in VIX and SKEW and
one daily lag of each as well as of the dependent variable. The sum of the response coefficients to VIX and
SKEW are reported. One, two, and three asterisks denote rejection of the null that the coefficient sums are
equal to zero at the 90%, 95% and 99% thresholds, respectively. The sample period is January 5, 1990 to
December 31, 2012.
The table shows that the unconditional negative response to VIX documented above is
driven by low strike price options, with high strike and at-the-money options actually re-
sponding positively. As we saw in Table 2.3, long-term, low strike puts comprise about 30
percent of all open interest. By put-call-parity, low strike calls are effectively equivalent
to low strike puts with respect to crash risk. These represent an additional 7-13 percent
of open interest. Chen et al. (2014) document that closing of open positions in far out-of-
the-money index puts predicts (positive) stock market returns and attribute this to market
makers reacting to tightening VaR constraints by shedding risky positions in general (i.e.
including stocks themselves). The pattern we document is consistent with covering of crash
risk positions by protection sellers in response to increased market variance. However, it is
28Specifically, at date t we examine the change in open interest from t − 1 to t for options whose strike
and maturity place them in basket k at date t. The regressions also include a lag of the dependent variable.
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well known that VIX does not predict future stock returns. So the position covering isolated
by Chen et al. (2014) is likely driven by something other than dealer responses to increases
in market risk.
Low strike put positions also contract in response to increased left tail risk (although now
there is a positive response in the low strike calls). Perhaps surprisingly, positions exposed
to right-tail risk – high strike puts and calls – also contract on an increase in SKEW. By
contrast, at-the-money positions, which have the highest gamma, expand.
Table 2.8: Risk Effects: Physical versus Risk-Neutral Uncertainty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
E[σ2] -0.3623 -0.1961 -0.3724 -0.1882 -0.1225 -0.1105
(4.50) (2.75) (4.08) (2.39) (1.96) (2.25)
VRP -0.1824 -0.0827 -0.1903 -0.0705 -0.0359 0.0658
(1.86) (0.98) (1.94) (0.89) (0.46) (1.21)
BBD -0.4724 -0.4402
(4.06) (5.02)
U¯y(3) -1.5572 -2.1098 -1.4390 -0.7622
(3.14) (4.52) (3.37) (2.14)
cns.cnf -0.0016 -0.0076 -0.0165 -0.0166
(0.45) (3.03) (4.17) (5.45)
rm1Q -0.0284 -0.2164 -0.3419 -0.5868
(0.07) (0.55) (1.02) (1.76)
R2 0.29 0.40 0.29 0.46 0.58 0.49
N 5789 5548 5789 5548 5548 5548
The table shows OLS regressions of aggregate index option quantities on measures of physical and risk-neutral
uncertainty, and risk-aversion proxies. E[σ2] is the 30-day-ahead forecast variance from an EGARCH model
of market returns. VRP is the difference between the VIX index (squared) and this forecast. U¯y(3) is
index of macroeconomic uncertainty at the 3-month horizon created by Jurado et al. (2015). cns.cnf is
the University of Michigan index of consumer confidence. rm1Q is the trailing three-month return on the
market index. Column (6) repeats the specification in (5) with open interest in out-of-the-money puts as
the dependent variable. All the risk variables are in logarithms. Newey-West (1987) t statistics (shown in
parentheses) are computed with one year of lags. The sample period is January 5, 1990 to December 31,
2012.
Risk measures derived from options prices reflect both risk and risk aversion (marginal
utility) in investor perception of future states. That is, they reflect the “risk neutral” dis-
tribution of stock returns, rather than the “physical” or “true” distribution. This raises the
question of whether option quantity responses in Table 2.6 are reflecting the endogenous
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risk aversion component or the exogenous risk component. To get at this issue, we do three
things. First, we decompose VIX into a statistical forecast of true market return variance
and a residual that can be interpreted as the variance risk premium (VRP). Second, we
include a gauge of exogenous economic risk not derived from options prices or stock returns.
Third, we include proxies for investor sentiment (or risk aversion).
For the variance return forecasts, we fit an EGARCH model to daily futures returns since
1983 that includes asymmetry effects and leptokurtosis (via t distributed innovations). The
model delivers one-day-ahead expected return variances every day. We iterate the forecasts
to 30-day horizon for comparability with VIX.
The exogenous risk measure, taken from Jurado et al. (2015), is a formal estimate of the
conditional second moment of a broad cross-section of macroeconomic time-series at the
monthly level. The authors estimate prediction equations for 132 variables29 that explicitly
allow for time-varying first and second moments. They then average the forecast standard
deviations to different time horizons. We employ their three month measure U¯y(3).
For risk aversion, we employ the University of Michigan consumer confidence index,cns.cnf ,
as well as the lagged quarterly return on the S&P 500 index itself, rm1Q to proxy for possible
extrapolative expectations.
Table 2.8 shows regression results with these controls.30 The first column establishes that
the negative response of OI to VIX is driven by the true variance component. There is
also some evidence of a negative response to the variance risk premium, but the statistical
significance is not robust across specifications. Column (2) confirms this conclusion by
showing that the negative response to the Jurado et al. (2015) measure of “fundamental”
risk is even stronger than the response to forecasted stock market volatility.
Moreover, the risk aversion proxies in (3) - (4) do not appreciably change the uncertainty
effect. Interestingly, when both these variables and U¯y(3) are included (in (4)), we see a
substantially larger coefficient on exogenous risk and a significant negative response to the
consumer confidence measure.31 If this measure is indeed picking up investor risk aversion,
and if risk aversion was partially responsible for the negative variance response, then one
would have expected a positive response to cns.cnf (since lower values indicate pessimism).
Column (5) in the table includes the BBD measure that we interpreted above as potentially
capturing longer horizon variance, but which is a measure of investor concerns and thus also
29The forecasts use information in 279 time series: the macro series plus 147 financial predictors. The
uncertainty measures are taken from http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/ludvigsons/jlndata.zip.
30For brevity, the table focuses on second-moment proxies and omits the ones from Table 2.8 that we
interpreted as higher measures of tail risk.
31The finding that there is no significant response of index options positions to market returns is robust
to the return horizon: lagged one-week and one-month returns also have no significant effects.
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reflects risk and risk aversion. This variable again enters significantly negatively and more
strongly than in Table 2.6. It also strengthens the negative response to consumer sentiment,
suggesting that the BBD response is due to the fundamental, exogenous component of risk
in this index.
Finally, since Table 2.3 shows that out-of-the-money puts comprise, on average, almost
half of open interest, we repeat specification (5) using only these options as the dependent
variable.32 Our specifications have less overall explanatory power for the low-strike puts. The
responses to the uncertainty variables are somewhat weaker, but still statistically significant.
Table 2.9: Risk Effects: Uncertainty versus Disagreement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BOS 0.4863 1.1526 1.3196 0.8377 0.5162
(0.71) (2.24) (2.95) (2.67) (1.80)
SPF -0.1417 0.1163 0.0442 0.0321 -0.1437
(0.94) (1.20) (0.48) (0.47) (2.72)
U¯y(3) -2.5481 -3.1221 -2.1458 -1.0752
(5.35) (6.86) (4.55) (2.72)
cns.cnf -0.0099 -0.0173 -0.0187
(4.18) (4.91) (7.61)
BBD -0.4249 -0.4149
(4.80) (6.15)
R2 0.03 0.42 0.50 0.59 0.49
N 5548 5548 5548 5548 5548
The table shows OLS regressions of aggregate index option quantities on measures of survey dispersion and
other controls. BOS and SPF are constructed from, respectively, the Business Outlook Survey and the
Survey of Professional Forecasters. Both surveys are compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Column (5) repeats the specification in (4) with open interest in out-of-the-money puts as the dependent
variable. Newey-West (1987) t statistics (shown in parentheses) are computed with one year of lags. The
sample period is January 5, 1990 to December 31, 2012.
Another important distinction in the measurement of risk is between uncertainty and
disagreement. It seems plausible that differences of opinion between market participants
are correlated with fundamental risk. This can be investigated using measures of survey
dispersion. As discussed in the introduction, there is a strongly grounded prediction for a
32When using out-of-the-money puts, the regressions also control for contemporaneous market returns
because of the mechanical effect: a fall in the market automatically leads to fewer out-of-the-money strike
prices, etc.
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positive relationship between measures of heterogeneity – like differences of opinions – and
quantities of options positions. We have, however, documented the opposite relationship to
volatility measures. This implies that, controlling for uncertainty, the regressions can isolate
the belief differences as components of survey dispersion.
We have two dispersion measures. The first (called BOS) is from Bachmann et al. (2013),
and is constructed from the dispersion in responses to the Business Outlook Survey conducted
monthly by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve.33 This is a regional survey of executives of
manufacturing firms and concerns their operational climate. In contrast, the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF), also compiled by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve, is a
quarterly assessment of the national economic outlook as gauged by economists. We employ
the interquartile range of forecasts for real GDP growth in the current quarter.34
Table 2.9 shows that there is no evidence that these dispersion measures relate to options
positions on their own (first column) but that, controlling for macroeconomic uncertainty
(second column) the predicted positive role for disagreement does emerge, at least using
the BOS survey.35 The conclusion is reinforced by inclusion of the indexes for consumer
confidence and policy uncertainty (in (3)-(4)). Specification (5) uses only the out-of-the-
money put open interest, which yields less positive dispersion responses, comparable to
those in (1).
While the incremental explanatory power for index option positions of the BOS measure is
small in our regressions, it is perhaps remarkable to find an association at all given that the
topic of the survey (local manufacturing outlook) is several steps removed from the direct
concerns of the index options markets.
Summarizing the results in this section, we highlight the following conclusions.
1. The most significant determinant of fluctuations in OI is a negative response to risk,
which is not driven by the risk-aversion component in measures of investor sentiment,
nor by differences of opinion. For example, regressions including only E[σ2] and U¯y(3)
achieve an R2 of 40 percent.
2. Increases in belief dispersion and deterioration of investor sentiment induce signifi-
cant positive responses of OI. Even with limited proxies for these, explanatory power
33This series and the BBD measure are from http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.
5.2.217.
34These measures only capture disagreement about the first moment of economic activity (i.e. expected
growth), and do not speak to difference in beliefs about higher moments.
35Our findings here accord with those of Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) who build a model of options trade
driven by differences of belief about the economic state and calibrate it using a survey-based measure of
disagreement. Overidentifying tests fail to reject the model’s restrictions on open interest changes for a
cross-section of S&P 500 options during 1986-1996. Regression evidence is moderately supportive of a
positive association between option volume levels and belief differences.
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approaches 60%. (e.g. specification (4) in Table 2.9).
3. There is also evidence of a positive quantity response to some measures of tail risk (the
VIX-SKEW interaction, volatility of volatility, and MM index). Unreported regressions
combining these with the variables above yields an R2 over 70%.
The negative risk response is consistent with the model of Chen et al. (2014) in which one
class of agents (e.g., dealers) have tolerance for unspanned crash risk that is higher than that
of another class (e.g., investors) in normal times, but which diminishes rapidly in the face of
rising risk, possibly due to binding VaR constraints (that do not apply to the investors). The
contrasting positive responses we document present a more complex challenge to theorists.
One possibility is that these measures are all, to some extent, picking up subjective measures
of investor sentiment or marginal utility, to which dealers are less susceptible.
Whatever the correct interpretation, empirically we have succeeded to a significant degree
in describing the factors driving index options positions. As Figure 2.10 illustrates, the fitted
specification (model (4) of Table 2.8 is shown) tracks the historical data series closely for
over 20 years.
2.6 Conclusion
A enormous and still-growing body of research studies stock index option prices. This liter-
ature recognizes the unique ability of this class of derivatives to identify investor preferences
and risk assessment. We contribute to this research by presenting the first comprehensive
look at quantities of these options. A complete understanding of the role that these options
play in the economy should aim to explain both the price and quantity dimensions. Our
work thus fills an important gap in the empirical options literature.
Measured in terms of monetary value or gross volatility exposure, the index options market
is small. But it is large in terms induced of exposure to jumps. Out-of-the-money puts
constitute the predominant position type, suggesting that the primary function of this market
is the transfer of unspanned crash risk.
Guided by theories of derivative usage, we seek to explain the time-variation in options
exposures by variables potentially capturing frictions, types of heterogeneity, and risks.
The stochastic trend in options usage is well-described by exogenous equity market activity.
We interpret the explanatory power of stock market turnover as proxying for heterogeneity
(and possibly frictions). Direct evidence on the nature of this heterogeneity is still lacking.
It does not appear to be linked to the participation shares, or retail (household) investors or
that of mutual funds, pensions, or banks and brokers.
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Figure 2.10: Index Option Quantities: Empirical Fit
We also do not find evidence linking options quantities to proxies for trading costs, infor-
mation technology, or interest rates. While the available proxies are not ideal, this finding
speaks to a widely-held view that options offer cost advantages to some investors, and that
this drives demand.
Finally, Using a rich collection of uncertainty proxies, we distinguish distinct responses
to exogenous macroeconomic risk, risk aversion, differences of opinion, and disaster risk.
Together these can explain most of the variation in detrended open interest. The single
most important relationship is a strong negative response to increases in variance. This is
consistent with a negative supply effect driven by sellers of crash risk.
Overall, these findings lay the groundwork for further development and testing of theoret-
ical models of multi-agent economies.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPLORING THE MIDAS TOUCH: INVESTMENT
BANK CONNECTIONS AND MUTUAL FUND
RETURNS
3.1 Introduction
Understanding the sources of gains in the delegated asset management industry is both of
academic interest and practical importance. According to French (2008), individual investors
increasingly delegate their investing decisions to professional investors. Does the performance
of the professional investing industry, especially mutual funds – one of the biggest industry
players – at least partly justify the public trust? Academic literature generally takes a more
skeptical view of mutual fund performance in general. Empirical regularities indicate that
the actively managed fund does not outperform passive investment strategies on average,
net of fees and after controlling for differences in systematic risk exposure. However, a small
subset of funds persistently outperforms the rest. One question naturally arises: what drives
the superior performance of a small group in the mutual fund industry?
One strand of promising answers lies with private information. Starting from Grossman
and Stiglitz (1976), academic literature reaches a consensus that information acquisitions by
a certain group of investors affects asset price movements. If certain types of investors have
incentives to costly acquire certain information relevant to asset price, yet clandestine to
investors in general, then we must observe them earning a return from asset price moving in
the corresponding direction in the future. Otherwise, those investors will not have incentives
to acquire information which is costly. Correspondingly, Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) find
that the sensitivity of changes in mutual fund portfolio allocations to the release of public
information, which is freely accessible to all investors, decreases with fund managers’ skills
and fund performance. In general, the theoretical and empirical evidence indicate that access
to relevant private information is at least partly responsible for superior alphas generated by
skillful mutual funds. Although the information acquisition channel is theoretically promis-
ing, empirical evidence for fund managers’ information acquisition behavior is scant, since
observing their day-to-day activities is impossible. Even identifying the source of private
information possessed by fund managers is empirically a daunting task.
This paper fills the gap by examining the fund managers’ exposure to one of the informa-
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tion nexus of capital markets, i.e., investment banks, and their impact on fund managers’
portfolio allocation decisions, trading decisions ahead of value-relevant event realizations,
and portfolio performance. On the one hand, it is well-documented that investment banks
glean superior information about their clients through IPO marketing, M&A advising, etc.
The information possessed by investment banks is so crucial that it affects their clients’
decisions in choosing investment banks with which to do business. Specifically, the infor-
mation accumulation by investment banks forces corporate America to retain a long-term
relationship with one investment bank, and avoid using the same investment bank as their
competitors (Asker and Ljungqvist, 2010). On the other hand, recent literature has doc-
umented that information often disseminates through social ties among economic agents.
Those social ties are built over time through a common alma mater, common work expe-
riences, and even shared avocational activities (e.g., Cohen et al. (2010); Engelberg et al.
(2012)). Built on these two strands of literature, we conjecture that mutual fund managers’
previous work experience in investment banks facilitates access to covert information regard-
ing clientele firms of their previous employers. As a result, the trading decisions made by
”connected” managers regarding those clientele firms’ stocks should, on average, generate
positive abnormal returns, compared with trading decisions made regarding other stocks in
the same portfolio. Investment banks have a particularly good guess about the outcome of
some corporate events they are directly involved with, such as M&A deals. Therefore, trad-
ing decisions made by those connected managers, ahead of those corporate events, should
predict the eventual outcome of those events.
These hypotheses are echoed in our findings. Specifically, utilizing the BrokerCheck and In-
vestment Adviser Public Disclosure (IAPD) databases from FINRA and SEC, respectively,
we collect work experience information in investment banks for a group of 500 randomly
selected mutual funds included in the CRSP survival-bias free mutual funds, and fund man-
agers of each fund, as archived by MorningStar Global Fund Managers Database. First of
all, investment banks constitute a significant part of the career path of average mutual fund
managers. Out of 499 mutual funds in our sample, about half of their managers worked in
investment banks before joining the asset management industry. Moreover, a simple trading
strategy that follows the fund managers’ quarterly reported portfolio allocations on stocks
from their former employers’ clients generates a meaningful 88 basis points monthly abnor-
mal return from the Fama-French four factor model, while mimicking the same manager’s
portfolio allocations on ”nonconnected” stocks’ general alphas from the same factor model
indistinguishable from zero. The difference in abnormal returns between the two portfo-
lio allocations is 77 basis points per month, which is both economically and statistically
significant.
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Having documented superior abnormal returns generated by fund managers’ trading de-
cisions regarding stocks from their former employers’ clients, we proceed with a change-in-
change type of robust check. Specifically, we find that the abnormal return disappears once
the underlying firm in question switched to a new investment bank that the fund manager
did not work with before the current job. Lastly, using Lehman Brothers demise in 2008
as an exogenous shock to the information tie for fund managers previously employed by
Lehman, we again find that the positive abnormal return from trading decisions made on
connected stocks in the Lehman-connected managers’ portfolios disappears after Lehman’s
bankruptcy.
The last part of this analysis documents one possible channel through which fund man-
agers get value-relevant information from their former employers. Investment banks play
a significant role in most of the M&A deals (e.g., Derrien and Dessaint (2014)). It is also
well-documented that takeover targets earn significant positive returns after the M&A an-
nouncements. Correspondingly, we find that the mutual fund managers’ holdings percentage
of a connected stock has predictive power of the firm becoming an M&A target in the near
future. The significant predictability is not present in M&A deals involving target firms
independent of fund managers according to our professional tie. Overall, we document that
one important channel through which a certain group of mutual funds generates positive and
persistent alphas is their acquisition of private information using their social relations with
investment banks.
Related Literature Our paper contributes broadly to two strands of literature. First is
the drivers of mutual fund alphas. Empirical literature documents that actively managed
mutual funds do not outperform passive investment strategies, after taking fees and sys-
tematic risk-taking into consideration. However, a small group of mutual funds consistently
outperforms the rest of the industry. Moreover, the stock pick ability of those best perform-
ing mutual funds are empirically more compelling compared with market-timing ability (e.g.,
Kacperczyk et al. (2014)). Our paper complements this strand of literature by document-
ing that one potential channel, through which mutual fund managers glean value-relevant
private information and make investment decisions accordingly, is using professional connec-
tions to their previous investment bank employers and investing stocks of those investment
banks clients. Since the investment banking business features oligopoly, with a handful of
investment banks dominating various types of the investment banking business, our findings
with regard to information leakage through investment banking employment relationships
shed light on a broad sector of public traded stocks.
Moreover, our paper also contributes to the social network in finance literature. Recent
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empirical works show that social networks facilitate information transmission in various sec-
tors of financial markets. For example, Cohen et al. (2008) show that mutual fund managers
who share common educational and vocational ties with corporate board members generate
positive abnormal returns for the firms boarded by those directors. Cohen et al. (2010)
similarly find that sell-side analysts connected with corporate officers through common alma
maters make more profitable stock recommendations for the firms employing those connected
officers. In corporate finance literature, Engelberg et al. (2012) document a lower cost of
bank loans when the lender and borrower share similar education and work experience. The
borrowers’ stock return and credit rating improve following such connected loan deals. Our
paper contributes to the literature by documenting a new type of social connection between
fund managers, and the stocks they invest in, through business operations and employment
practices of the investment banking industry. As investment banks play crucial rules in most
capital market transactions, either facilitating the information transmission, or reducing the
adverse selections, our findings could extend to other contexts where investment banking is
central.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical method-
ology and proxies for fund-bank and firm-bank connections; Section 3 presents the empirical
results; Section 4 offers concluding remarks.
3.2 Empirical Methodology
In this section, we construct the empirical proxy of fund-bank and firm-bank connections,
and explain the details of several data resources.
3.2.1 Fund-Bank Connection
In this paper, we use mutual fund manager’s past investment bank work experience as a proxy
for the fund-bank connection. Since there is no available database for this, we hand collect
the work experience information in investment banks for a group of 500 randomly selected
mutual funds included in the CRSP survival-bias free mutual funds, and fund managers of
each fund, as archived by MorningStar Global Fund Managers Database. We start from
the CRSP mutual fund holdings data, where we get all the mutual fund managers’ holdings
and their full names. We merge CRSP and MorningStar data sets by managers’ last name
and then search managers’ names in Investment Adviser Public Disclosure (IAPD) from
SEC and BrokerCheck from FINRA. IAPD provides information about current and certain
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former Investment Adviser Representatives, Investment Adviser Firms registered with the
SEC and/or state securities regulators, and Exempt Reporting Advisers that file reports
with the SEC and/or state securities regulators. BrokerCheck provides information about
current and former FINRA-registered brokers and brokerage firms.
We match 370 mutual fund managers from the four data sources. We then narrow down
the mutual funds with a single manager. We also exclude all index funds and bond funds in
the sample. In our sample, a mutual fund manager may have several past work experiences
with different investment banks. We only consider his/her latest work experience. In the
end, our final data set covers 499 equity mutual funds and 199 ”connected” mutual fund
managers.
3.2.2 Firm-Bank Connection
To proxy the firm-bank connection, we follow the literature standard and use the SDC
data. We use the firm’s past 5 years’ M&A advising and issuance underwriting business
with an investment bank as a proxy for the firm-bank connection. We focus on the top 100
investment banks. The advising and underwriting business includes all deals related to M&A,
IPO, SEO, preferred stock, convertible bond, nonconvertible bond, private equity and private
debt. There are three possible cases regarding the firm-bank connection: ”NonConnected”,
”UniConnected” and ”MultiConnected”. For each firm, at each quarter, we look at the
past five-year window. If there is no deal at all, then firm is ”NonConnected”. If all deals
are advised from the same investment bank, then firm is ”UniConnected” to this bank. If
deals are advised from different banks, the firm is ”MultiConnected”. In this paper, we
only consider the ”UniConnected” case as the information tie between bank and firm. Thus,
when we mention ”connected”, we really mean uniquely connected.
3.3 Results
In this section, we develop hypotheses and test them empirically. We first present the
evidence of mutual fund managers’ superior performance on stocks which are connected to
the investment bank for which they used to work. Then we examine two events that break
the information tie: 1) firm switching investment bank; and 2) collapse of Lehman Brothers.
Mutual fund managers’ stock picking skills disappear after the network breaks. Finally,
we present evidence of M&A takeover information leakage in this network. All empirical
evidence shows that social networks facilitate information transmission in financial markets.
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3.3.1 Hypothesis I: Superior Performance
Hypothesis I If there is information flow in the network, the fund manager will show stock
picking skills on the connected stocks. Connected stocks will outperform the non-connected
stocks.
To test this hypothesis, we construct a zero-investment long-short portfolio strategy. At
the end of each quarter, mutual fund managers report their portfolio holdings. Each stock in
the manager’s portfolio holdings is classified as ”connected” or ”non-connected” depending
on whether the firm is uniquely connected to the investment bank for which the manager
formerly worked. Then we form value-weighted portfolios. A zero-investment portfolio is also
formed by taking a long position of connected stocks and a short position of non-connected
stocks. We regress the portfolio returns on standard Fama-French 3 factors and Fama-French
3 plus momentum 4 factors.
Table 3.1: Superior Performance of Connected Stocks
Panel A: 1-mo Abnormal Return on the Reporting Month
Connected Non-Connected Long-Short
FF3 0.0077* -0.0016 0.0077**
(1.84) (-1.38) (2.16)
FF3+UMD 0.0086** -0.0007 0.0077**
(2.17) (-1.12) (2.51)
Panel B: 3-mo Abnormal Return after the Reporting Month
Connected Non-Connected Long-Short
FF3 0.0056** -0.0014** 0.0054*
(2.05) (-2.11) (1.83)
FF3+UMD 0.0056** -0.0014** 0.0054*
(2.06) (-2.10) (1.84)
The abnormal returns are reported in Table 3.1. Panel A presents the results from trading
strategies of investing for only 1 month on the reporting month. Panel B presents results from
trading strategies of investing for 3 months after the reporting month. All portfolios are re-
balanced every quarter, since we only have a quarterly snapshot of managers’ holdings. The
zero-investment portfolio earns a significant abnormal return of 54 to 77 bps per month. The
abnormal returns are mainly driven by the long side of the trading strategy. The evidence
supports our prior hypothesis. Managers show stock picking skills on the connected stocks.
We take a further look at the superior performance of the connected stock portfolio.
Within this group, we re-examine the firm-bank connection, depending on how long ago
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the firm-bank connection was built. We shorten the time window to one year. Within
the one year window, if there is at least one advising or underwriting deal, the firm is
classified as short-term connected (”ST-Connected”); otherwise it is classified as non-short-
term connected (”Non-ST-Connected”). Table 3.2 shows abnormal return regression results
using the 4 factors model. The ”ST-Connected” portfolio earns significant positive abnormal
returns of 72 bps per month. However, the ”Non-ST-Connected” portfolio’s alpha is not
statistically significant, though positive. We see the positive performance is mainly driven by
the short-term connected group. This is consistent with the finding that investment banks
glean superior information about their clients through various advising and underwriting
businesses.
Table 3.2: Short Term Connected
3-mo Abnormal Return after the Reporting Month
Connected ST-Connected Non-ST-Connected
FF3+UMD 0.0056** 0.0072** 0.0019
(2.06) (2.02) (0.66)
3.3.2 Hypothesis II: Switching Investment Banks
Hypothesis II When the firm-bank link breaks, the manager’s stock picking skills will
disappear.
Firms may not always maintain a business relationship with one particular investment
bank, for various reasons. In our data sample, we do see firms switching investment banks.
This provides a very good set-up to test our main hypothesis of information flow within a
social network in a diff-in-diff manner. When firms switch to a new investment bank, the
old bank will not have the most updated information, thus managers connected to the old
bank will not show superior stock picking skills after the break of this information tie.
Table 3.3 presents the portfolio returns regression results using the 4 factors model. Con-
sistent with our prior hypothesis, mutual fund managers show stock picking skills before the
firm-bank link breaks. Connected stocks portfolios earn significant abnormal returns of 56 to
86 bps per month before firms switch investment banks. However, the superior performance
disappears right after the firm switches its investment bank.
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Table 3.3: Firm Switching Investment Bank
1-mo Abnormal Return on the Reporting Month
Before After
FF3+UMD 0.0086** -0.0014
(2.17) (-0.19)
3-mo Abnormal Return after the Reporting Month
Before After
FF3+UMD 0.0056** -0.0020
(2.06) (-0.49)
3.3.3 Hypothesis III: Collapse of Lehman Brothers
Hypothesis III When the fund-bank link breaks, the manager’s stock picking skills will
disappear.
In this part, we explore another connection breaking event – the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers in 2008. After Lehman collapsed, Lehman-connected mutual fund managers lost their
information tie with Lehman-connected firms. Thus we conjecture that Lehman-connected
mutual fund managers’ stock picking skills will disappear after the fund-bank connection
breaks.
Results from Table 3.4 are consistent with our prior conjecture. Lehman-connected man-
agers show superior positive performance before 2008. When Lehman Brothers collapsed,
the Fund-Bank connection broke, and Lehman-connected managers’ stock picking skills on
Lehman-connected stocks disappeared.
3.3.4 Takeover News
Investment banks play a significant role in most of the M&A deals. It is well-documented
that takeover targets earn significant positive returns after the M&A announcement. In this
section, we test whether mutual fund managers take advantage of private information regard-
ing M&A takeover deals. To test this hypothesis, we perform a logit regression specified in
equation (3.1). The left-hand variable is a dummy variable showing whether a firm becomes
an M&A target in the following quarter. The key right-hand variable is the percentage of
stock holdings in a manager’s portfolio. We conjecture that if a manager has private infor-
mation regarding an M&A takeover deal, he/she will take a significant long position of the
target firm before the announcement. The logit regression results are presented in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.4: Collapse of Lehman Brothers
1-mo Abnormal Return on the Reporting Month
Before After
Connected 0.0238** -0.0109
(2.48) (0.20)
Non-Connected 0.0030 0.0031
(1.23) (0.55)
Long-Short 0.0185* -0.0161
(2.03) (0.29)
3-mo Abnormal Return after the Reporting Month
Before After
Connected 0.0110** 0.0182
(2.26) (1.48)
Non-Connected -0.0002 -0.0011
(-0.09) (-0.55)
Long-Short 0.0089* 0.0202
(1.69) (1.54)
The PctHoldingInPortfolio variable has no predictive power of the firm becoming an M&A
target in the non-connected group. But it has predictive power in the connected group.
Logit(0|1Takeover)t = βPctHoldingInPortfoliot−1 + γiControlsi,t−1 + t (3.1)
3.4 Conclusion
This paper examines the mutual fund managers’ exposure to one of the information nexus
of capital markets, i.e., investment banks, and their impact on fund managers’ portfolio al-
location decisions, trading decisions ahead of value-relevant event realizations, and portfolio
performance. On the one hand, it is well-documented that investment banks glean superior
client information through IPO marketing, M&A advising, etc. On the other hand, infor-
mation often disseminates through social networks among economic agents. Built on these
two strands of literature, we investigate whether mutual fund managers’ previous work ex-
perience in investment banks facilitates their access to covert information regarding clientele
firms of their previous employers.
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Table 3.5: Takeover News
Connected Non-Connected
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PctHoldingInPortfoliot−1 0.004* 0.004* 0.000 0.000
(1.89) (1.73) (0.67) (0.90)
TobinQt−1 -0.005** -0.001***
(-2.11) (-2.70)
Leveraget−1 0.027** 0.003**
(2.16) (2.38)
LogAssett−1 -0.003** 0.000*
(-2.36) (-1.68)
CashF lowt−1 0.085 0.001
(0.52) (0.19)
ROAt−1 -0.018 -0.001
(-0.11) (-0.92)
SaleGrowtht−1 -0.016 -0.000
(-1.31) (-0.65)
Fund Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1,841 1,214 295,690 254,869
To use social networks to identify information transfer in security markets, we focus on
connections between mutual fund managers and investment banks via managers’ past work
experience. We find mutual fund managers show significant stock picking skills on firms
which are the long-term clients of the investment banks for which the managers have for-
merly worked. Managers perform significantly better on connected holdings relative to non-
connected holdings. A replicating portfolio of connected stocks outperforms a replicating
portfolio of non-connected stocks by approximately 7.4% per annum. We also compare the
stock performance before and after two network-break events (firm switching investment
banks and Lehman’s collapse) and find that managers’ stock picking skills disappear when
connections break.
We also document one possible channel through which fund managers obtain value-relevant
information from their former employers – M&A takeover news. We find that the mutual
fund managers’ holdings percentage of a connected stock have a predictive power of the
firm’s becoming an M&A target in the near future.
To sum up, social networks facilitate information transmission in financial markets. All
empirical results are consistent with mutual fund managers gaining an informational advan-
tage through social networks.
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APPENDIX A
INDEX OPTIONS
A.1. Contract Description
This appendix provides details on the three classes of options that the study amalgamates.
CBOE S&P 500 Index (SPX) Options .
The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) began trading options based on S&P
500 index with the ticker symbol SPX in 1983. The SPX options are European style,
and are cash-settled. The SPX options have a large notional size with a multiplier of 100
of the underlying index value. The CBOE has introduced numerous variants of its basic
products over the years, including those with smaller denomination, end-of-quarter and
end-of-week expirations, longer term (LEAPS), and closing-price settlement.1 The
most liquid versions have consistently been the standard third-friday expirations on
the March, June, September, December cycle augmented with the nearest two non-
cycle monthly expirations. The CBOE options were exclusively pit traded until 2012
when trading in a parallel version was launched on the CBOE’s electronic exchange,
known as C2.
Our data on CBOE options comes from two sources: the CBOE itself and Option-
Metrics. The latter is a commercially available database going back to 1996. The
CBOE itself has stored data from 1990 onward, which we acquired. Our data in-
cludes most of the minor variants listed above, as well as the flagship liquid product.
The data include closing price, traded volume, and open interest for every available
strike-expiration pair of puts and calls.
CME S&P 500 Futures Options .
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) began trading futures contracts referencing
the S&P 500 in 1982, and introduced options on them in 1983. The underlying for each
1Currently the standard products are settled by an average of opening prices of the underlying index stocks
on expiration day. Closing-based settlement procedures were used when the options were first introduced.
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option is one cash-settled futures contract; the original futures contract unit size was
500 times the index value. This was lowered to 250 in 1997. The options are American
style.2 The futures contracts have the same quarterly, third-friday settlement calendar
as the main CBOE products. The CME options may have expiration date the same as,
or prior to, the future settlement. As with the CBOE, the most liquid products are the
nearest few months (with standard third-friday expiration). Also like the CBOE, the
CME has experimented with variants like end-of-week and end-of-month expirations
with limited investor interest.
In contrast, an extremely successful variation has been the introduction of smaller
denomination contracts. The CME began trading so-called “e-mini” S&P 500 futures
in 1997 with a contract size of 50 times the underlying index value. In 1997, the
CME listed options based on the e-mini contract, again with one option on one futures
contract. In every respect other than denomination, the original (“big”) contract and
the e-mini are the same: the options are American and the primary expiration dates are
the same cycle. The trading mechanisms for the big and little contracts are different,
however. Both futures and options on the former are primarily pit-traded, while e-mini
futures and options are traded on Globex, the CME’s electronic limit order book.3
Our data on futures options was purchased from the CME and goes back to contract
inception in 1983. We have the same basic end-of-day statistics as for the CBOE.
Coverage includes the minor contract variants, as well as the main big and e-mini
options.
Options on SPDR ETFs (SPY) .
Introduced in 1993, State Street’s Standard & Poor’s Depositary Receipts (SPDR –
ticker symbol SPY) has become an extremely liquid exchange-traded fund (ETF) that
is designed to closely track the S&P 500 stock market index. In 2005, the CBOE
introduced options based on SPDRs. SPDRs are traded like common stock and the
SPDR options have the same features as standard listed U.S. stock options: American-
style exercise and physical settlement (not cash). Each SPDR options contract is on
100 units of the underlying ETF. However, the denomination of the ETF is 1/10th of
the value of the S&P 500 index itself. Thus, effectively, one option on SPY references
10 index-equivalent units.
Our data on SPY options comes from OptionMetrics, which consolidates data across
2Note that these options are not cash-settled: exercise results in a long or short position in the futures
contract.
3The big contracts are also eligible for trade on Globex.
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multiple option exchanges.
A.2. Efficient Computation of American Option Exposures
This appendix describes the computational method used to handle the large number of
American-style options on futures traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Our study
requires us to aggregate the volatility exposures (“vegas”) across all options with any open
interest on a given day. This, in turn, requires an “implied volatility” for each such option.
Because the options are American and early exercise is sometimes optimal, closed-form so-
lutions are not available. Numerical methods are required for two separate steps. First,
a calibration step is required to deduce an implied volatility for each option. Second, the
volatility sensitivity of the resulting valuation is computed. We need to do this for approxi-
mately four million option observations with nonzero open interest.
Our approach utilizes binomial trees as the basic valuation model. While trees can be
made quite fast, the primary numerical challenge to a brute-force approach is in the implied
volatility step, which would require an inefficient search over the space of trees.
To deal with this, we construct highly accurate, multidimensional look-up tables (LUTs).
We precompute option values on a four-dimensional grid of expiration, interest rate, mon-
eyness, and volatility. The two steps described above can then be performed through a
combination of implicit and explicit interpolation within these tables, as we describe below.
For each node on the grid we evaluate call and put prices on a third-moment tree as per
Tian (1993), with analytical smoothing (via Black’s formula) in the last step as suggested by
Broadie and Detemple (1996). This procedure has among the best convergence properties
of the methods studied by Joshi (2007).
Implied volatility. Given an option price, the first step is to do an implicit interpolation
in our LUT to deduce the volatility which would yield that price. That is, given the
time to expiration, interest rate,4 and moneyness, we linearly interpolate to obtain the
option values, oˆ(σi), at each node on our volatility grid, {σ}i. The volatility grid values
are then treated as a function, and its value is interpolated at the observed price of
the option over the grid defined by oˆ, to obtain the implied value σˆ.
The procedure fails when the option price is low enough that it is in (or below) the
early exercise region, where the volatility surface is not invertible. In this case, we
can assign the option an implied volatility of zero without loss of accuracy because
4We use the 30 day eurodollar rate from the Federal Reserves H15 survey as the riskless rate in pricing
calculations.
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the ultimate object of interest is the volatility sensitivity of the option, which must
necessarily be zero for such an option. (These zero implied volatility values are not
themselves used for anything else).
Sensitivity. Given the implied σˆ, we obtain the volatility sensitivity via numerically dif-
ferencing the values in our LUT along the volatility dimension, and then explicitly
interpolating the differenced LUT at the observation’s expiration, interest rate, mon-
eyness, and implied volatility. Our grid step size was chosen with the specific criterion
of achieving acceptable accuracy of these first differences.
This step is quite efficient since 4-dimensional linear interpolation can be handled by
vectorized Matlab routine interpn. A single call to this routine suffices to handle
all the put data; a second processes all the calls.
A.3. Nonstationary Regressions
The inferences in the tables in Table 5 are all made under the null hypothesis that the
estimated trend from the previous section correctly removes the nonstationarity from OI.
However, it is well known that stock market turnover (which drives the fitted trend) is
positively correlated with volatility. Therefore it is worth asking whether inference about
the trend is affected by the presence of uncertainty variables, and vice versa. As a robustness
check, we therefore run the regressions on the raw (not detrended) OI series, with TO on
the right-hand side.
One needs to be careful econometrically with estimating such specifications, since it re-
quires inference about the joint effects of stationary and nonstationary variables. Ordinary
least squares (OLS) is not appropriate for such inference due to the spurious regression
problem. However the consistency of OLS under the null of cointegration has been shown
by Park and Phillips (1988,1989) who also derive the nonstandard asymptotic theory. Here
we adopt the null hypothesis of a correctly specified cointegrating relationship (as per the
FIML results) and we report finite-sample standard errors computed via simulation under
this null.5 This specification includes no seasonal growth term. The results, shown in Table
A.1 indicate that there little evidence of misestimation of the turnover coefficient due to the
omission of risk variables. The risk responses themselves are somewhat attenuated in this
specification, but remain economically large.
5Specifically the simulation assumes that the nonstationary independent variables, differenced, together
with the stationary independent variables follow a stationary AR(1) process, which is independent from the
cointegrating residuals, which are also an AR(1) process.
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Table A.1: Nonstationary Open Interest Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VIX -0.3942 -0.9827 -0.9305 -0.9380
(3.15) (5.21) (4.74) (4.82)
SKEW -9.1617 -8.3063 -8.3863
(3.20) (2.88) (2.96)
VIX∗SKEW 3.4607 3.1707 3.2227
(3.59) (3.27) (3.30)
σV IX 0.2379 0.1999
(3.30) (2.89)
FDISP 0.8105
(1.40)
BBM 0.0014
(1.77)
U¯y(3) -1.0891
(1.58)
TO 1.6017 1.5973 1.6074 1.6389
(0.84) (0.82) (0.76) (0.50)
N 5776 5776 5776 5526
The dependent variable in the regressions is the raw (non-detrended) aggregate open interest series. The
independent variables are as described in the captions to Tables 2.6 and 2.8. Finite sample t statistics, shown
in parentheses, are computed under the null of cointegration between OI and TO with a cointegrating vector
(−1, 1.70).
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